Topic starter
24/10/2026 9:48 pm
TL;DR: Wallet-based identity is only safe when the requesting organisation is governed, not merely identified, Procivis details. Wallets need machine-readable authorisation and revocation so they can enforce who may ask for data across jurisdictions.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Procivis: “EUDI wallet-relying party registration”.
Key questions
Q: Why do wallet ecosystems need a public relying party register?
A: Because a wallet can only protect the user if it can verify who is asking before data is shared.
Q: What breaks when relying parties are not registered before wallet use?
A: The trust model collapses into ad hoc judgement at the point of disclosure.
Q: How should organisations govern wallet relying party access in digital identity ecosystems?
A: Treat relying-party access as an authorisation problem, not only a registration exercise.
Practitioner guidance
- Define the relying-party approval workflow Map who can approve, what evidence is required and which services may request which wallet attributes before any registry goes live.
- Build machine-readable trust lists Publish registry entries in signed, queryable form so wallets can verify authorisation automatically rather than relying on manual checks.
- Separate authentication from authorisation Make sure wallet authentication does not substitute for a relying-party permission check, especially when attributes are sensitive or jurisdiction-specific.
Bottom line: Wallet-based identity is only safe when the requesting organisation is also governed, not merely identified.
Glossary terms: Wallet-Relying Party, Relying Party, Selective Disclosure, Federated Trust
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This topic was modified 6 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
25/10/2026 11:13 am
Wallet relying party registration is the missing trust control in wallet-based identity. Digital identity systems often focus on proving the user and ignore the requesting organisation. That leaves a governance gap where any service can claim it needs wallet data unless a separate trust layer says otherwise. The practical implication is that wallet ecosystems need explicit relying-party authorisation, not just strong user authentication.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should digital identity programmes separate user authentication from relying party authorisation?
A: Yes. User authentication proves control of the wallet, but it does not prove the requester is entitled to receive the data. A mature programme must enforce both sides of the transaction, with authentication for the holder and registry-backed authorisation for the relying party.
👉 Read our full editorial: EUDI wallet relying party registration closes a trust gap
This post was modified 6 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group