TL;DR: The identity relay chain works because Iran-aligned phishing can turn inbox access into account access, Abnormal AI explains. Phishing-resistant MFA and tighter post-login governance are the controls that better match this failure mode.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Abnormal AI: “Tracking Iran-Aligned Cyber Operations Following U.S.-Israel Strikes”.
Key questions
Q: Why do compromised mailboxes make internal phishing more effective?
A: A compromised mailbox converts an external threat into a trusted internal sender.
Q: How can security teams tell whether credential theft has moved into cloud persistence?
A: Look for MFA registration changes, new OAuth app consents, unusual sign-ins, and service principal or admin role changes after the initial compromise.
Q: What breaks when organisations rely on OTP codes as the main defence against phishing?
A: OTP alone breaks when attackers can proxy the legitimate login session and harvest the code as the user enters it.
Practitioner guidance
- Deploy phishing-resistant MFA for exposed identities Require FIDO2 security keys or passkeys for executives, administrators, and anyone who can alter email, identity, or endpoint settings.
- Monitor internal sender abuse and mailbox takeovers Add detections for unusual internal sending, suspicious forwarding changes, and new message patterns from accounts that rarely send mail externally.
- Audit OAuth consents and MFA registration changes Review recent application consents, new MFA device registrations, and changes to service principals or privileged roles in the identity provider.
Bottom line: Iran-aligned phishing campaigns are exploiting a gap between email trust and identity trust, using mailboxes and live token capture to convert messages into account access.
Glossary terms: Real-Time Phishing Kit, Mailbox compromise, Phishing-Resistant MFA, Identity Relay Chain
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Inbox trust is now an identity control surface, not just a communication channel. The article shows that phishing succeeds when organisations treat email as separate from identity governance. Once a mailbox is trusted, it can be used to reset trust, redirect users, and extend the attack inside the collaboration stack. Practitioners should read inbox compromise as a governance failure across authentication, session trust, and delegated access.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when phishing leads to account compromise?
A: Accountability is shared, but security leadership owns the control environment that made impersonation succeed. Email authentication, browser trust configuration, access scoping, and incident reporting are governance responsibilities, not just end-user habits. If phishing can repeatedly turn into compromise, the control model is failing at the organisational level.
👉 Read our full editorial: Iran-aligned phishing campaigns expose identity gaps in the inbox