TL;DR: Broad internal protocols, excessive reachability, standing privilege, and weak containment readiness let a single compromise become enterprise-wide disruption, according to Zero Networks’ analysis of 54 trillion activities across 312 enterprise environments in its 2026 Lateral Movement Exposure Report. The real issue is not breach prevention alone, but how far an attacker can travel once inside.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Zero Networks: Top 10 Lateral Movement Risks in Enterprise Networks (and What to Do About Them)
By the numbers:
- The report analyzed 54 trillion activities across 312 enterprise environments.
- A single compromised host can reach 85% of internal systems in the first hop.
- Roughly 80% of organizations have deployed AI agents, and two-thirds have no governance policies for them.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when internal segmentation is not aligned to identity scope?
A: When segmentation does not match identity scope, a valid credential can authenticate far beyond the access it actually needs.
Q: Why do standing privileges increase lateral movement risk so much?
A: Standing privileges give an attacker a ready-made route through the environment if a credential is stolen or misused.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about lateral movement prevention?
A: They often treat lateral movement as a detection problem when it is also a design problem.
Practitioner guidance
- Map east-west trust paths by identity type Inventory which humans, service accounts, workloads, and AI-connected systems can reach critical internal segments, then remove paths that are not operationally required.
- Close administrative protocols by default Treat RDP, SMB, SSH, WinRM, WMI, and similar protocols as on-demand access paths.
- Reduce standing privilege before you tune detection Review which identities have broad internal reach but rarely use it, especially service accounts and privileged operators.
What's in the full article
Zero Networks' full report covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The report's full benchmark data on protocol exposure, reachability, and privilege sprawl across 312 enterprise environments.
- Practical containment patterns for RDP, SMB, SSH, WinRM, and other administrative paths that need on-demand control.
- The report's breakdown of AI agent exposure and why broad standing access changes lateral movement risk.
- Implementation guidance for closed-by-default segmentation and identity-driven microsegmentation.
👉 Read Zero Networks' 2026 lateral movement exposure report →
Lateral movement exposure: what it means for containment planning?
Explore further
Containment, not perimeter defense, is the real control objective. This report reinforces a long-standing identity security truth: initial access is only the beginning of the incident. Once an attacker is inside, the question becomes how much of the environment that identity can still reach. Teams that focus exclusively on blocking entry miss the operational reality that lateral movement is what turns compromise into downtime.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities, according to The 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, which shows how quickly identity failures repeat when governance gaps remain.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a compromised identity reaches critical systems?
A: Accountability sits across identity governance, network architecture, and platform ownership because no single control layer can contain lateral movement by itself. IAM teams own privilege scope, infrastructure teams own reachability, and security teams own containment logic. If any of those layers assumes the others will compensate, the blast radius grows.
👉 Read our full editorial: Lateral movement risk is now a business continuity problem