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25/06/2026 1:22 am
TL;DR: Least privilege violations often emerge through excessive administrator rights, dormant accounts, unresolved segregation of duties conflicts, and unmanaged service identities, according to SecurEnds. The practical issue is not awareness but control drift: access grows faster than reviews, remediation, and visibility across human and non-human identities.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by SecurEnds: Least privilege violations and how to detect them
By the numbers:
- Only 44% of organisations have implemented any policies to manage their AI agents, despite 92% agreeing that governing AI agents is critical to enterprise security.
- Systems with least-privileged AI access had a 17% incident rate vs 76% for over-privileged systems.
- 53% of security leaders expect AI to run major portions of their infrastructure autonomously within the next three years.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when least privilege is not enforced across users and service accounts?
A: Access expands beyond current need, which creates excess attack paths, audit findings, and harder containment during incidents.
Q: Why do service accounts complicate least privilege governance?
A: Service accounts often hold broad, long-lived access that is harder to review than human user access.
Q: How do organisations know whether access reviews are actually working?
A: Look for declining counts of overprivileged users, dormant privileged accounts, unresolved SoD conflicts, and repeated audit findings.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory all entitlement classes separately Build a single view of employee accounts, privileged users, service accounts, APIs, SaaS entitlements, and infrastructure identities so excessive access can be compared against current business need.
- Revoke temporary access when the task ends Remove troubleshooting, migration, vendor support, and emergency permissions as part of the same workflow that granted them, and confirm revocation before the exception becomes standing access.
- Rework roles that carry unnecessary entitlements Review role design for copied permissions, broad inherited rights, and outdated application access so role structures stop embedding privilege creep into new accounts.
What's in the full article
SecurEnds's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A practical list of least-privilege warning signs mapped to specific identity types and governance failures.
- Examples of how recurring access reviews, temporary access expiry, and service-account oversight fit into remediation workflows.
- The platform's approach to centralized entitlement visibility, remediation tracking, and audit reporting.
- Specific guidance for teams modernising governance risk and compliance software around access sprawl.
👉 Read SecurEnds's analysis of least privilege violations and access sprawl →
Least privilege sprawl: what IAM teams are missing now?
Explore further
25/06/2026 10:45 am
Least privilege violations are usually a governance drift problem, not a single control failure. The article is right to treat administrator sprawl, dormant access, and weak review cycles as warning signs rather than isolated symptoms. In identity programmes, permissions rarely become excessive all at once; they accumulate through unchanged roles, expired exceptions, and incomplete offboarding. Practitioners should treat drift as the main failure pattern, not the exception.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 44% of organisations have implemented any policies to manage their AI agents, despite 92% agreeing that governing AI agents is critical to enterprise security, according to The 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey.
- Another 69% of security leaders agree identity management must fundamentally shift to address agentic AI systems, which shows how quickly access governance assumptions are changing in practice.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when excessive access is left in place?
A: Accountability typically sits with the identity, application, and business owners who approve, retain, or fail to revoke access. Governance frameworks also expect security teams to provide visibility and evidence, but ownership cannot be delegated away. If no one can explain why access still exists, the control model has already failed.
👉 Read our full editorial: Least privilege violations are widening across human and NHI access
