TL;DR: Managing multiple identity providers is costly and security-intensive, especially when M&A, multi-cloud, and fragmented app estates leave access paths, policy models, and user experiences inconsistent, according to Strata Identity. The real issue is not consolidation alone but the governance drift that appears when identity control planes multiply faster than teams can normalize them.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Strata Identity: identity provider rationalization, orchestration, and enterprise identity resilience
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should organisations rationalise multiple identity providers without breaking applications?
A: Start by inventorying which applications depend on each identity provider, then rank those dependencies by business criticality and migration complexity.
Q: Why does identity provider sprawl create security risk in large enterprises?
A: Because each provider can enforce slightly different authentication, claims, and session rules, which creates inconsistent access outcomes across the estate.
Q: How do security teams know whether IDP rationalization is actually working?
A: Look for fewer identity decision exceptions, fewer duplicated policy rules, and clearer ownership of authentication and lifecycle functions across applications.
Practitioner guidance
- Map identity decision ownership across all providers Document which IDP controls authentication, claims issuance, session policy, and lifecycle hooks for each application path.
- Classify coexistence states with explicit retirement criteria Define which legacy identity paths are temporary, which are business critical, and what conditions must be met before they can be removed.
- Track policy drift between identity control planes Compare conditional access rules, token lifetimes, claim mappings, and exception handling across providers on a recurring basis.
What's in the full article
Strata Identity's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The vendor's own engineering rationale for switching to calendar versioning and why that matters for release cadence
- Examples of identity provider discovery and rationalisation across complex enterprise estates
- Implementation patterns for unified SSO and header-based application support
- Engineering examples showing how identity orchestration is applied without rewriting every application
👉 Read Strata Identity's analysis of identity provider rationalization and orchestration →
Multiple identity providers: what governance gap are teams missing?
Explore further
IDP rationalization is really a governance standardisation problem, not a tooling replacement exercise. The central issue is that enterprises often inherit multiple identity control planes with different policy models, access lifecycles, and integration assumptions. That fragmentation weakens assurance across human identity, service access, and application trust. Practitioners should treat rationalization as a control design problem first and a platform decision second.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, 38% have no or low visibility, and a further 47% have only partial visibility, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should IAM leaders do when an identity provider must remain in place during migration?
A: Treat it as a temporary trust boundary with documented expiry conditions, not a permanent exception. Restrict new dependencies, keep application mappings explicit, and track which access flows still rely on the older provider. If the coexistence state has no end date, it becomes inherited sprawl rather than migration support.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity provider rationalization exposes the hidden IAM sprawl problem