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22/06/2026 1:42 pm
TL;DR: Privileged network administrator accounts can become a cyberattack gateway, operational disruption source, compliance gap, and insider threat if they are not continuously discovered, owned, and remediated, according to SPHERE Technology Solutions. The governance problem is not admin work itself, but unmanaged privileged access that leaves too much power invisible, persistent, and hard to account for.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by SPHERE Technology Solutions: The Hidden Power and Risk of Network Admins
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams manage privileged network administrator accounts?
A: Security teams should inventory every privileged network admin account, assign a named owner, review access on a recurring schedule, and remove excess privileges quickly.
Q: Why do privileged network accounts increase breach and outage risk?
A: They increase risk because they can change configurations, move traffic, and access sensitive systems.
Q: What do organisations get wrong about privileged access reviews?
A: They often review access without verifying ownership, business need, or current usage.
Practitioner guidance
- Build a complete privileged account inventory Identify every network administrator account, including dormant, orphaned, and device-local accounts, then map each one to an owner and business purpose.
- Assign explicit accountability for each account Require a named human owner for every privileged identity so review, escalation, and remediation do not stall when access needs to be investigated.
- Prioritise remediation of excessive privileges Use risk scoring to remove broad entitlements first, especially where administrative access crosses multiple systems or persists beyond current job needs.
What's in the full article
SPHERE Technology Solutions' full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A practical breakdown of how SPHEREboard discovers privileged users across network devices and supporting infrastructure.
- The article's own explanation of how it prioritises risky accounts and assigns ownership for accountability.
- Operational context on automated remediation without disrupting network stability or day-to-day administration.
- The source also shows how the vendor frames compliance and resilience benefits for teams managing privileged access.
👉 Read SPHERE Technology Solutions' analysis of network admin privilege risk →
Network admin privilege sprawl: what IAM teams need to address?
Explore further
This topic was modified 1 hour ago by Mr NHI
22/06/2026 1:47 pm
Privileged network admin access is an identity governance asset, not an IT convenience. The article correctly frames network administrators as both operationally essential and structurally risky. That is why privilege must be managed as an identity control surface with ownership, lifecycle, and review, not as an informal administrative exception. Practitioners should treat these accounts as high-value identities with explicit accountability.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities, according to the 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, according to the same report.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a privileged admin account causes an incident?
A: Accountability should sit with the account owner, the system owner, and the security team that oversees privileged access governance. If no one can explain why the account exists or who approved it, the governance model has already failed. Clear ownership is what makes investigation, escalation, and remediation possible.
👉 Read our full editorial: Network admin privileged access is the hidden enterprise risk
