Topic starter
22/06/2026 1:42 pm
TL;DR: Privileged network administrator accounts can become a cyberattack gateway, operational disruption source, compliance gap, and insider threat if they are not continuously discovered, owned, and remediated, according to SPHERE Technology Solutions. The governance problem is not admin work itself, but unmanaged privileged access that leaves too much power invisible, persistent, and hard to account for.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SPHERE: “Are You Overlooking Your Network Admins? How to Discover and Secure Hidden Privileged Users with Identity Intelligence”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not continuously governed?
A: When privileged access is not continuously governed, standing privilege persists, dormant accounts remain usable, and the attack surface expands across human and machine identities.
Q: Why does manual administration of privileged accounts increase security and operational risk?
A: Manual administration increases risk because it depends on people to enter, approve, and revoke access correctly every time.
Q: What are the signs that privileged access governance is failing in OT networks?
A: Common warning signs include shared administrator accounts, inconsistent access rules across sites, unmonitored vendor sessions, and frequent exceptions for legacy compatibility.
Practitioner guidance
- Continuously discover privileged network admin accounts Inventory every privileged account across network devices, management planes, and related infrastructure so no administrative access remains outside the programme’s view.
- Assign accountable owners to each admin account Map each account to a named business or technical owner, then make that ownership visible in access reviews and remediation workflows.
- Flag orphaned and excessive privileges for removal Prioritise accounts with no owner, overly broad rights, or unclear business justification, and remove or down-scope them before they become persistent exposure.
Bottom line: Network administrator access is risky when it is unmanaged, not because administration itself is unusual but because the privilege is broad and persistent.
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22/06/2026 1:47 pm
Privileged network administration is an identity governance problem, not just an infrastructure problem. The article shows that routers, switches, and firewalls become security liabilities when the accounts that manage them are not continuously discovered and assigned. That is an access lifecycle failure, not merely an admin workload issue. Practitioners should treat network admin privilege as part of the identity estate that must be inventoried, owned, and reviewed.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 61% of organisations still define privileged users as humans only, overlooking the role of non-human identities in privileged access, according to KPMG.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should IAM and PAM teams treat network admin access differently from standard user access?
A: Yes. Network admin access should be governed as a separate privileged population because it controls infrastructure change, not just application login. IAM and PAM teams need shared ownership, tighter entitlement scope, and faster remediation when the account no longer matches operational need.
👉 Read our full editorial: Network admin privileged access is the hidden enterprise risk