TL;DR: Mismanaged access, overprivileged identities, and static credentials are expanding attack surface as modern infrastructure shifts toward NHIs and cloud-native workflows, according to Apono’s analysis. The governance problem is no longer just access control at rest, but whether IAM can continuously discover, scope, and revoke machine access fast enough to matter.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Apono: 8 Identity & Access Management (IAM) Best Practices to Implement Today
By the numbers:
- 38% of breaches trace back to stolen credentials.
- In healthcare, insiders abusing privileged access accounts account for 70% of breaches.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams implement JIT access for non-human identities?
A: Start by making privilege temporary by default.
Q: Why do service accounts and API keys increase IAM risk?
A: Service accounts and API keys increase risk when they are long-lived, overprivileged, or poorly owned.
Q: What breaks when organisations rely on manual access reviews for NHIs?
A: Manual access reviews break down when identities are created dynamically and change faster than the review cycle.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every non-human identity and assign ownership Build a continuously updated inventory of service accounts, API keys, tokens, certificates, and pipeline identities.
- Replace standing secrets with short-lived credentials Use ephemeral tokens for deployments, admin tasks, and machine-to-machine access.
- Enforce task-scoped JIT for privileged access Make elevated access temporary, approval-based, and automatically revoked when the task ends.
What's in the full article
Apono's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step guidance for implementing RBAC, ABAC, and context-aware access policies across cloud and SaaS systems.
- Practical examples of JIT workflows for break-glass access, CI/CD jobs, and temporary elevated permissions.
- Operational detail on discovering, categorising, and rotating non-human identities at scale.
- Examples of centralised access request flows and audit logging patterns across the stack.
👉 Read Apono's analysis of IAM best practices for human and machine identities →
NHI governance gaps in IAM: what teams should fix first?
Explore further
Standing access is the governance failure this article really exposes. The article describes a world where credentials outlive the task, the team, and sometimes the system that created them. That is not just poor hygiene, it is a broken lifecycle assumption in NHI governance. When service accounts, tokens, and API keys persist after their original purpose ends, least privilege becomes theoretical. Practitioners should treat standing access as a measurable control defect, not a policy preference.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a compromised machine identity causes a breach?
A: Accountability should sit with the team that owns the identity lifecycle, not with the last person who touched the system. If no owner can explain why the identity exists, what it can access, and when it expires, the control model is already failing.
👉 Read our full editorial: IAM best practices for NHI governance in modern cloud stacks