Topic starter
24/10/2026 8:48 pm
TL;DR: OT identity security is harder when legacy assets, shared credentials, intermittent connectivity, and privileged access collide, according to Xage Security. OT governance then has to preserve attribution, segmentation, and temporary access even when devices cannot support modern controls.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Xage Security: “5 OT Identity and Access Management Security Challenges”.
By the numbers:
- Credential-based attacks accounted for 80% of initial-access cases involving access brokers, according to Microsoft’s 2025 Digital Defense Report.
Key questions
Q: Why do legacy OT assets make modern IAM controls harder to apply?
A: Legacy OT assets often cannot support modern authentication methods, agents, or directory integration.
Q: How should organisations prioritise JIT access over standing privileged access in OT?
A: Organisations should prioritise just-in-time access whenever elevation is tied to a specific task or maintenance window.
Q: What breaks when OT privileged access is left in shared accounts and exceptions?
A: What breaks is accountability.
Practitioner guidance
- Map OT access paths by identity domain Document which users, vendors, controllers, and services authenticate through each OT, IT, DMZ, and cloud path before rationalising controls.
- Broker access for legacy assets Place an identity-aware access layer in front of devices that cannot support modern authentication, then enforce MFA, command scoping, and session logging at the gateway.
- Convert standing elevation to JIT access Tie privileged OT access to approved tasks, set explicit expiry, and remove dormant vendor and contractor elevation automatically when work is complete.
Bottom line: OT identity security fails when legacy assets, shared credentials, and intermittent connectivity are treated as edge cases instead of design constraints.
Glossary terms: Operational Technology Identity, Offline-Capable Enforcement, Runtime Credential Brokering, Just-in-time privilege
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This topic was modified 6 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
25/10/2026 11:13 am
OT identity security is a governance problem before it is a technology problem. Critical infrastructure environments fail when teams assume modern IAM patterns can be dropped into legacy operations without adaptation. They cannot, because the access model has to respect site autonomy, safety constraints, and intermittent connectivity at the same time. Practitioners should treat OT identity as a distinct control plane with its own operating realities.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do OT teams maintain secure access when remote sites lose connectivity?
A: OT teams need local policy enforcement, local authentication and authorisation data, and offline session recording so approved work continues during WAN outages. If controls depend entirely on central connectivity, operators will either lose access or weaken the rules to keep systems running. Resilience depends on preserving policy at the edge.
👉 Read our full editorial: OT identity security needs offline PAM for legacy critical assets
This post was modified 6 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group