Topic starter
02/11/2026 11:03 am
TL;DR: Arcon shows that access attempts outside conventional PAM can bypass monitoring, logging and enforcement, leaving critical endpoints exposed even when privileged access processes are in place. Endpoint security now depends on seeing and controlling attempts that occur beyond the managed path, not only the sessions that enter through it.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Arcon: “Beyond PAM: How ARCON | EPM Helps Close the Endpoint Access Security Gap”.
Key questions
Q: How should security teams handle endpoint access that bypasses normal PAM workflows?
A: Endpoint access that bypasses normal PAM workflows should be forced back through a governed workflow with strong authentication, session brokering, approval, and recorded access paths.
Q: Why does monitoring privileged access attempts not fully solve the security problem?
A: Monitoring privileged access attempts does not fully solve the security problem because monitoring detects activity after access is requested or used, but it does not stop misuse, credential abuse, or unauthorised elevation.
Practitioner guidance
- Map endpoint access paths outside PAM Identify which systems can be reached without passing through the standard privileged workflow, including contractor, integration and merged-environment paths.
- Separate monitoring from enforcement Define one control objective for detecting outside-PAM attempts and a second for blocking them before connection establishment.
- Require authentication before endpoint connection Make pre-connection authentication mandatory for critical endpoints so that direct access attempts cannot proceed on trust alone.
Bottom line: Endpoint access risk does not stop at the PAM boundary, because direct connections can evade the same controls that protect managed sessions.
What's in the full article
Arcon's full blog post covers the operational detail this analysis intentionally leaves for the source:
- How Outside PAM Monitoring captures user identity, IP address, service type and access time for endpoint attempts
- How Outside PAM Restriction blocks unauthorised connections and requires authentication through the PAM path
- How the capabilities support audit readiness with detailed logs, reporting and investigation records
- How the same model applies across third-party access, healthcare, mergers and acquisitions and critical infrastructure
👉 Read Arcon's analysis of endpoint access security beyond conventional PAM →
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02/11/2026 8:09 pm
Outside-PAM access is a control-boundary problem, not just a logging problem. The article shows that privileged access governance can be technically correct inside the PAM workflow and still fail to cover the access paths that matter most. That leaves a blind spot where endpoint access can occur without the same identity, policy and audit context. Practitioners should treat this as a boundary-design issue in privileged access architecture, not as a narrow product feature question.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Why does monitoring privileged access attempts not fully solve the security problem?
A: Monitoring privileged access attempts does not fully solve the security problem because monitoring detects activity after access is requested or used, but it does not stop misuse, credential abuse, or unauthorised elevation. Security teams still need preventative controls such as approval gates, least privilege, session control, and restricted credential exposure.
👉 Read our full editorial: Endpoint access security gaps persist beyond conventional PAM controls