Topic starter
08/07/2026 6:58 pm
TL;DR: Remote work pushes privileged access outside the office perimeter, where VPNs, shared passwords, and standing admin rights leave too much exposure and too little visibility, according to Securden. The security model now has to shift from broad connectivity to identity-based, session-controlled access that limits credential exposure, scopes targets, and preserves auditability.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Securden: “Securing Remote Access for Work from Home Employees using PAM”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when remote access still depends on persistent VPN credentials?
A: Standing VPN credentials create revocation and reuse problems.
Q: Why do standing administrator rights increase risk in cloud and remote access environments?
A: Standing rights expand the window for abuse because excess privilege remains available long after the original need passes.
Q: How do you know whether privileged remote access is actually under control?
A: Look for unique identities, session-level logging, clear approval boundaries, and a documented revocation process.
Practitioner guidance
- Replace broad VPN reach with scoped privileged access Route remote administration through controlled access paths that limit users to approved targets rather than full network visibility.
- Remove standing admin rights from remote workflows Use time-bound elevation so privileged rights exist only for the approved task and expire after use.
- Vault privileged credentials away from endpoints Keep passwords and other secrets in a central vault and inject them only during the controlled session.
Bottom line: Remote work exposes the weakness in connectivity-first access models because privileged sessions need control over scope, credentials, and review.
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08/07/2026 7:21 pm
Remote access security fails when connectivity is treated as the control. The real governance boundary is not whether a user can connect, but whether the session is tied to identity, target scope, and recorded privilege use. PAM is therefore a governance layer, not just a delivery mechanism, because it converts broad reachability into bounded, accountable access.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 36% of health IT leaders say their organisation applies a privileged access strategy consistently across the enterprise, according to Ponemon Institute research.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do when vendors need elevated remote access to internal systems?
A: Organisations should treat vendor access as tightly scoped, temporary, and continuously checked. Assign one accountable contact per vendor, limit access to only the approved users, keep vendor devices off the corporate VPN, and use a proxy or similar access path that avoids direct network attachment. Each login should also confirm the user still works for that vendor.
👉 Read our full editorial: PAM for remote access: why broad connectivity is no longer enough