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08/07/2026 6:58 pm
TL;DR: Remote work pushes privileged access outside the office perimeter, where VPNs, shared passwords, and standing admin rights leave too much exposure and too little visibility, according to Securden. The security model now has to shift from broad connectivity to identity-based, session-controlled access that limits credential exposure, scopes targets, and preserves auditability.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Securden: How does a PAM solution help businesses enable secure and controlled remote access?
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams secure remote privileged access without relying on VPN trust?
A: Use PAM as the enforcement point for privileged work, not as a thin wrapper around network access.
Q: Why do standing admin rights create so much risk in remote work environments?
A: Standing admin rights keep elevated access available even when the task is finished, which increases misuse, compromise, and lateral movement risk.
Q: What do organisations get wrong about secure remote access for vendors and support teams?
A: They often confuse temporary access with safe access.
Practitioner guidance
- Replace network-only trust with target-scoped privileged sessions Route remote administration through PAM workflows that expose only approved systems, not the wider network.
- Eliminate standing admin rights for routine remote work Use just-in-time elevation for administrative tasks so privileges expire when the work ends.
- Vault and rotate credentials used for remote administration Store privileged secrets centrally, inject them without exposing passwords to endpoints, and rotate them after use or on a fixed schedule.
What's in the full article
Securden's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step remote administration workflows for RDP, SSH, and browser-based access.
- Session recording and audit reporting details for compliance and investigation use cases.
- Approval and time-bound access flows for just-in-time privileged elevation.
- Password vaulting and rotation mechanics for shared and vendor privileged accounts.
👉 Read Securden's analysis of PAM for secure remote access controls →
PAM for remote access security: are your controls tight enough?
Explore further
08/07/2026 7:21 pm
Broad remote connectivity is not privileged access control. VPNs, remote desktops, and browser gateways solve reachability, but they do not by themselves enforce least privilege, credential invisibility, or session accountability. Once remote work becomes the default operating model, identity teams must stop treating the transport layer as the control layer. The practitioner conclusion is straightforward: the access path and the privilege boundary cannot be the same thing.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 23.7% of organisations share secrets through insecure methods such as email or messaging applications, according to The 2024 Non-Human Identity Security Report.
- 59.8% of organisations see value in a solution that simplifies non-human access management and introduces dynamic ephemeral credentials.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a privileged remote session is abused?
A: Accountability sits with the organisation that granted the access and with the process that failed to constrain it. If the session lacked approval, scope limits, or recording, the gap is governance, not just user behaviour. That is why audit trails and lifecycle ownership matter for privileged access.
👉 Read our full editorial: PAM for remote access: why broad connectivity is no longer enough
