TL;DR: Traditional MFA remains vulnerable to phishing, credential stuffing, push bombing, and man-in-the-middle attacks, even as CISA, NIST, and the White House push organisations toward phishing-resistant authentication, according to Axiad. The real issue is not whether MFA exists, but whether it resists modern identity attack paths.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Axiad: Is Your MFA Broken?
By the numbers:
- PKI-based authentication typically accounts for 40% of use cases and can be leveraged for non-browser uses across workstations, mobile, Microsoft AD, and server authentication.
- FIDO accounts for approximately 60% of use cases, covering browser-based authentication use cases such as single-sign on applications and Windows workstations.
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams decide which MFA methods to keep?
A: Keep the MFA methods that can withstand modern phishing and relay attacks, not just the ones that are easiest to deploy.
Q: Why do traditional MFA methods still fail in real attacks?
A: Traditional MFA often fails because attackers do not need to break the factor itself.
Q: How do organisations know if their MFA is strong enough?
A: A useful test is whether the method resists phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks without relying on user judgment at the last moment.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every authentication method in use Classify which applications still rely on SMS, email, OTP, or push-only MFA, then map them to user populations and business criticality.
- Prioritise phishing-resistant MFA for privileged and remote access Use FIDO or certificate-based authentication for admin access, sensitive applications, and remote workflows where real-time relay attacks are most likely to succeed.
- Match PKI and FIDO to the right authentication flows Use PKI where you need workstation, server, or non-browser support, and use FIDO where browser-based login and user presence are the dominant requirements.
What's in the full article
Axiad's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The authentication-method walkthrough for SMS, OTP, push, PKI, and FIDO use cases
- The product-specific explanation of how Axiad Cloud combines credential management, enterprise PKI, and web authentication services
- The integration list covering SAML, Oauth, SCIM, RADIUS, and hardware partners such as Yubico and Thales
- The deployment discussion for non-browser authentication across workstations, servers, and federation paths
👉 Read Axiad's analysis of why traditional MFA fails against phishing →
Phishing-resistant MFA: where traditional authentication breaks down?
Explore further
Traditional MFA is now an insufficient assurance model, not just a weaker implementation. The article shows that phishing, push bombing, credential stuffing, and man-in-the-middle attacks can all bypass legacy MFA patterns. That means the security problem is no longer whether a second factor exists, but whether the factor resists adversary-in-the-middle techniques and user coercion. Practitioners should treat MFA strength as an assurance property, not a feature checklist.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which means most identity teams cannot reliably see the credentials already in circulation.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between PKI and FIDO for authentication?
A: PKI is better suited to certificate-backed, device-centric, and non-browser use cases such as workstations and servers. FIDO is better suited to browser-based logins and user-presence workflows. Most organisations need both, because each covers different parts of the identity and application landscape.
👉 Read our full editorial: Why traditional MFA still fails against phishing attacks