Topic starter
06/09/2026 9:33 am
TL;DR: Compromised credentials and standing admin rights still drive severe breaches, and CyberFOX argues that PAM reduces that exposure by enforcing least privilege, limiting lateral movement, and preserving audit evidence across privileged sessions. The governance lesson is simple: privileged access is not just an IT convenience issue, it is a core control boundary for ransomware resistance, compliance, and operational containment.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by CyberFOX: “Does PAM Improve Cybersecurity?”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not continuously governed?
A: When privileged access is not continuously governed, standing privilege persists, dormant accounts remain usable, and the attack surface expands across human and machine identities.
Q: Why does just-in-time access reduce ransomware risk?
A: Just-in-time access reduces risk because it shrinks the window in which a privileged credential can be abused.
Q: What are the signs that privileged access processes are breaking down in practice?
A: Common warning signs include password hunting by email or phone, credentials stored in spreadsheets or sticky notes, shared accounts that nobody fully owns, and ad hoc access requests that consume excessive time.
Practitioner guidance
- Remove permanent admin rights Identify accounts that carry standing elevation and replace that access with task-scoped privilege wherever continuous admin rights are not essential.
- Implement just-in-time elevation Grant privileged access only for the duration of a specific task and revoke it automatically as soon as the task is complete.
- Centralise privileged session logging Record requests, approvals, and session activity in a way that supports incident review, audit evidence, and anomaly detection.
Bottom line: Compromised credentials become far more dangerous when privileged access is standing, broad, and difficult to review.
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06/09/2026 9:34 am
Least privilege is still the control boundary that determines whether credential theft becomes an enterprise event. The article is correct to treat privileged access as a distinct risk tier, because ordinary user access and elevated access do not produce the same blast radius. When privilege persists after it is needed, identity governance has already failed at the point of assignment, not at the point of abuse. The practitioner conclusion is that privilege scope, not account volume, is the meaningful security metric.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between PIM and PAM for privileged access control?
A: PIM governs the privileged identity itself, while PAM governs the process of granting and monitoring elevated access. In practice, teams need both. PIM without PAM leaves activation paths weak, and PAM without PIM leaves permanent privilege unmanaged. The right model combines identity governance with request, approval, and session controls.
👉 Read our full editorial: PAM and least privilege: why privileged access still matters