TL;DR: Privileged access management reduces attack surface by limiting elevated access, enforcing just-in-time controls, and monitoring privileged sessions, according to Zluri’s guide. The real test is whether teams can replace static admin trust with lifecycle, logging, and audit discipline across human, service, and application accounts.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Zluri: “Privileged Access Management: An In-Depth Guide”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when standing privileged access is still the default?
A: Standing privilege breaks least-privilege governance because access remains available long after the specific task has ended.
Q: Why do standing privileges create outsized risk in PAM programmes?
A: Standing privileges create risk because they leave high-impact access available long after the original need has passed.
Q: How can security teams tell whether privileged access reviews are actually working?
A: They are working when every privileged entitlement is inventoried, every decision is traceable, and revoked access is removed from all connected systems without delay.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit standing privilege across all privileged identities Build a complete inventory of human admin accounts, service accounts, application accounts, and break-glass accounts that retain always-on elevated access.
- Convert permanent elevation to just-in-time approval Reserve elevated rights for the shortest task window possible and revoke them immediately after completion.
- Rotate privileged credentials on a governed schedule Treat passwords, tokens, SSH keys, and other privileged secrets as lifecycle objects that require periodic rotation, revocation, and retirement.
Bottom line: Standing privilege is still the central PAM weakness because elevated access often outlives the task that justified it.
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Standing privilege is the control failure PAM still has not fully retired: the core weakness is not that privileged access exists, but that it persists beyond the task that justified it. Static admin trust creates an attack window that is wider than most incident response assumptions account for, especially when the identity is a service or application account. The practitioner conclusion is that privileged access should be treated as a bounded entitlement, not a durable account state.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 49% of IT professionals would prioritise improving privileged access management if the decision were theirs alone, according to Netwrix's 2023 Hybrid Security Trends Report.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations manage service accounts and application accounts like admin users?
A: Yes, because those accounts can carry the same or greater operational power than human admins. They need inventory, ownership, rotation, monitoring, and offboarding controls, otherwise they become hidden standing privilege paths that survive long after the business need ends.
👉 Read our full editorial: Privileged access management still depends on standing privilege control