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12/06/2026 1:13 am
TL;DR: Privileged access management reduces attack surface by limiting elevated access, enforcing just-in-time controls, and monitoring privileged sessions, according to Zluri’s guide. The real test is whether teams can replace static admin trust with lifecycle, logging, and audit discipline across human, service, and application accounts.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Zluri: Miscellaneous Privileged Access Management, an in-depth guide
By the numbers:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
- 73% of vaults are misconfigured, leading to unauthorised access and exposure of sensitive data.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not tightly governed?
A: When privileged access is not tightly governed, attackers can use elevated accounts to move from simple access to administrative control, data exposure, or system disruption.
Q: Why do service accounts and other NHIs increase privileged access risk?
A: Service accounts and other NHIs increase risk because they often carry elevated rights, run continuously, and are reviewed less often than human accounts.
Q: How do organisations know if PAM is actually working?
A: PAM is working when elevated access is temporary, sessions are observable, and revoked rights do not reappear outside approved workflows.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every privileged account type Create one authoritative inventory for human admin accounts, service accounts, application accounts, and emergency accounts.
- Replace standing admin rights with task-scoped elevation Use just-in-time access for admin tasks wherever the workflow allows it.
- Record and review privileged sessions Enable session recording, command logging, and audit trails for every privileged path that can change systems, identities, or secrets.
What's in the full article
Zluri's full guide covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A step-by-step explanation of PAM workflows for creating, modifying, and deleting privileged accounts.
- A feature breakdown of session monitoring, logging, and audit reporting for privileged activity.
- A broader list of PAM capabilities across cloud, DevOps, remote access, and SaaS environments.
- Zluri's examples of access policy patterns such as JIT, RBAC, and least privilege in practice.
👉 Read Zluri's guide to privileged access management and privileged account control →
Privileged access management: are standing privileges still your weak spot?
Explore further
12/06/2026 10:59 am
Privileged access is where governance failure becomes operational breach risk. The article correctly treats PAM as a control layer for limiting damage, but the deeper issue is that organisations often manage privilege as an admin convenience problem rather than an identity risk domain. Once elevated access is treated as routine, abuse becomes harder to distinguish from legitimate work. The practitioner conclusion is simple: privileged access must be governed as a high-risk identity class, not a support function.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 73% of vaults are misconfigured, leading to unauthorised access and exposure of sensitive data, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when privileged access is misused?
A: Accountability sits with the identity, application, or system owner that approved, issued, or failed to revoke the privilege, not only with the security team. Effective PAM requires named ownership for every privileged account and a clear revocation path when access is no longer justified.
👉 Read our full editorial: Privileged access management still depends on standing privilege control
