Notifications
Clear all
Topic starter
10/07/2026 9:27 pm
TL;DR: Privileged accounts remain a concentrated attack path because privilege creep, standing access, weak session visibility, and inconsistent governance all expand blast radius, according to eMudhra. The governance gap is not passwords alone, but the assumption that elevated access can stay broad, persistent, and auditable without continuous control.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by eMudhra: the most critical security gaps that modern privileged access management helps organisations close
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams reduce risk from standing privileged access?
A: Security teams should replace persistent administrative access with time-bound elevation, task-scoped approvals, and strong session monitoring.
Q: Why do privileged accounts create more blast radius than standard user identities?
A: Privileged accounts can reach core systems, security settings, data stores, and administrative workflows that normal users cannot touch.
Q: What do organisations get wrong about shared administrator accounts?
A: They often treat shared admin access as a practical shortcut while ignoring the loss of accountability it creates.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every privileged identity path Build a complete register of administrator accounts, root access, service identities, contractor accounts, and shared credentials, then map each one to an owner, business purpose, and expiry condition.
- Eliminate standing elevation where possible Replace persistent administrative rights with just-in-time access and time-bound privilege elevation for tasks that do not require continuous access.
- Record and retain privileged sessions Enable session monitoring, command logging, and immutable retention for all high-risk administrative activity so investigations can reconstruct what happened without relying on user recollection.
What's in the full article
eMudhra's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Specific examples of how privileged access gaps map to ransomware, fraud, and exfiltration scenarios.
- Operational detail on session monitoring, credential vaulting, and approval workflows for admin access.
- Compliance evidence examples for ISO 27001, NIST, and eIDAS-aligned administrative controls.
- Guidance on applying least privilege across cloud, hybrid, and third-party access paths.
👉 Read eMudhra's analysis of the ten most common privileged access gaps →
Privileged identity gaps: what IAM teams need to fix now?
Explore further
10/07/2026 9:48 pm
Privilege creep is the quiet failure mode behind most privileged access exposure. The article correctly identifies that access often outlives the business need that created it. That is not an isolated administration issue, it is a lifecycle defect in PAM and IGA governance. When old permissions remain active, organisations inherit attack surface they no longer recognise, and the practical conclusion is that privilege review must be continuous rather than periodic.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when privileged vendor access remains active after a contract ends?
A: Accountability sits with the organisation that granted the access and the teams that failed to offboard it. Third-party privileged access must be tied to contract lifecycle events, monitored during use, and revoked automatically when the relationship changes. If that does not happen, the access outlives the business justification and becomes uncontrolled exposure.
👉 Read our full editorial: Privileged identity gaps are widening the blast radius for attackers
