TL;DR: PSD3 and PSR push European payment authentication toward stronger SCA, clearer delegated authentication liability, and EUDI Wallet acceptance for trust, according to Namirial. Payment teams then have to govern verification, authentication, and authorisation as one evidence chain.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Namirial: “PSD3 and PSR: what the new payment services rules mean for authentication, signatures, and digital identity”.
Key questions
Q: Why does delegated authority create more risk than simple authentication?
A: Authentication proves a subject presented a valid credential.
Q: How should payment teams prepare for EUDI Wallet acceptance under PSD3 and PSR?
A: They should treat wallet acceptance as an identity architecture change, not a feature toggle.
Q: What breaks when banks rely on SMS OTP as the only transaction authentication method?
A: Banks expose themselves to account takeover and transaction fraud because a stolen or relayed OTP proves only that a code was received, not that the session, device, or transaction is trustworthy.
Practitioner guidance
- Harden SCA against phishing and interception Replace SMS one-time passwords for high-risk actions with phishing-resistant authentication methods that cannot be captured or replayed through basic fraud techniques.
- Map delegated authentication ownership Record every delegated SCA path, the third party performing it, the accountable PSP owner, and the evidence needed to prove correct execution.
- Plan for wallet-based identity acceptance Design payment journeys so EUDI Wallet credentials can be accepted as part of the authentication stack without creating a parallel verification process.
Bottom line: PSD3 and PSR move payment authentication away from weak factor checking and toward assurance quality, liability clarity, and identity-backed trust.
Glossary terms: Strong Customer Authentication, Delegated Authentication, Verification Of Payee, Qualified Electronic Signature
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PSD3 and PSR expose an authentication quality gap, not just a compliance gap. The old model assumed that a second factor was enough if it was present. That assumption fails when the factor is trivially phishable, replayable, or interceptable, which is why the regulatory response is shifting from factor counting to assurance quality. For practitioners, the implication is that payment authentication must be judged by resistance to modern fraud paths, not by checkbox compliance.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What control evidence do auditors and regulators need when SCA fails?
A: They need proof that the right authentication method was applied, that it was bound to the transaction, and that the evidence was retained in a tamper-resistant form. Transaction logs alone are not enough if they cannot show who authenticated, how they authenticated, and what was signed or authorised.
👉 Read our full editorial: PSD3 and PSR turn payment authentication into a trust stack