TL;DR: The end-of-maintenance shift for SAP GRC, combined with broader cloud application sprawl, exposes the limits of siloed access governance for internal, external, and non-human identities, according to Saviynt. The practical issue is not just replacement tooling, but whether teams can unify visibility, certification, emergency access, and just-in-time controls across applications without multiplying complexity.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Saviynt: Breaking Free from SAP GRC: Modern Solutions for Application Access Challenges
By the numbers:
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams replace SAP GRC without losing access governance coverage?
A: They should start by mapping governance requirements across the full application estate, not just the ERP core.
Q: Why do siloed application controls fail when identities span multiple systems?
A: Because the risk often appears in the connections between systems, not in one application alone.
Q: How do teams know if just-in-time access is actually reducing privilege risk?
A: They should verify that temporary access has strict expiry, clear approval traceability, and dependable revocation after task completion.
Practitioner guidance
- Re-scope access governance across the full application estate Inventory ERP, SaaS, custom, and line-of-business systems together so role design, certification, and monitoring are not trapped inside one platform boundary.
- Separate human and non-human access review paths Create distinct review logic for service accounts, API keys, and other machine credentials so they are not forced through employee-oriented certification cycles.
- Make privileged access time-bounded by default Use just-in-time access for elevated application roles, with automatic de-provisioning, session logging, and end-of-window revocation controls.
What's in the full article
Saviynt's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How the vendor frames SAP GRC replacement options across ERP and non-ERP environments.
- The specific capability comparison between application access governance, emergency access, and continuous controls monitoring.
- The article's detailed examples of cross-application integrations and role engineering coverage.
- The source's discussion of cost and licensing implications when unused access is removed.
👉 Read Saviynt's analysis of SAP GRC replacement and access governance →
SAP GRC replacement: what identity teams need to rethink now?
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SAP GRC replacement is really a cross-application identity governance problem. The article is strongest when it moves beyond product substitution and points to a structural issue: governance models built around one ERP environment do not survive multi-vendor application estates. That matters because risk increasingly sits in the gaps between systems, not inside a single platform. Practitioners should treat replacement planning as a redesign of governance scope, not a feature checklist.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when emergency access is used across multiple applications?
A: Accountability sits with the identity and application governance owners who define the approval, provisioning, monitoring, and revocation workflow. When emergency access spans several systems, ownership must cover the whole chain, including audit evidence and exception handling. Without that, the control may exist technically but fail operationally.
👉 Read our full editorial: SAP GRC replacement exposes the limits of siloed access governance