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25/06/2026 5:07 pm
TL;DR: Secrets management is the credential control layer that turns zero trust from a policy slogan into an enforceable operating model for human-to-machine and machine-to-machine access, according to Entro Security. The core issue is that least privilege and continuous verification fail when secrets are static, scattered, or overexposed.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Entro Security: The role of secrets management in zero trust architecture
By the numbers:
- Only 44% of organisations are currently using a dedicated secrets management system.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern secrets in zero trust environments?
A: Security teams should govern secrets as the credential layer that makes zero trust enforceable.
Q: Why do service account secrets create so much risk in zero trust architecture?
A: Service account secrets create risk because they often provide standing, non-interactive access to multiple systems.
Q: What breaks when secrets are static instead of dynamic?
A: Static secrets break the assumption that access is temporary, contextual, and easy to revoke.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every non-human credential path Map passwords, API keys, tokens, certificates, and service-account secrets across code, pipelines, cloud accounts, and collaboration tools.
- Separate human and machine access policies Apply different issuance, validation, and revocation patterns for human users, workloads, and service accounts.
- Shorten secret lifetime wherever possible Replace reusable static secrets with short-lived credentials for tasks that can tolerate dynamic issuance.
What's in the full article
Entro Security's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How the vendor positions secrets management across human-to-machine and machine-to-machine access patterns
- Examples of where secrets fit into zero trust architecture alongside IAM and PAM
- The article's operational framing for continuous validation and least privilege in practice
- The vendor's broader product context for scanning and contextual intelligence around discovered secrets
👉 Read Entro Security's analysis of secrets management in zero trust architecture →
Secrets management and zero trust architecture: are your controls aligned?
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25/06/2026 5:37 pm
Secrets management is the trust engine of zero trust architecture, not an accessory to it. Zero trust cannot be enforced if the credential layer is opaque, long-lived, or fragmented across teams and platforms. The article is right to connect IAM, PAM, and secrets, but the deeper point is that credential governance is where policy becomes operational reality. For practitioners, that means treating secret governance as a core control boundary in the zero trust programme.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 44% of organisations are currently using a dedicated secrets management system, according to The 2024 State of Secrets Management Survey.
- 54% of organisations are dissatisfied with their current secrets management solution because not all secrets are secured, and 43% cite lack of central management.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who should own secrets governance in a zero trust programme?
A: Ownership should sit across IAM, PAM, and platform teams, with clear accountability for issuance, rotation, revocation, and auditability. The control problem is cross-functional because secrets appear in infrastructure, applications, pipelines, and cloud services. If ownership is fragmented, the environment will accumulate standing access that zero trust cannot see.
👉 Read our full editorial: Secrets management is the control layer that makes zero trust work
