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07/06/2026 9:14 pm
TL;DR: KuppingerCole’s Leadership Compass on secure remote access for OT/ICS argues that IT/OT convergence is widening attack surfaces while policy-enforced, session-monitored access becomes operationally necessary across critical sectors, according to SSH Communications Security. The governance shift is clear: remote access now depends on time-bound, auditable identity controls, not generic connectivity.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by SSH Communications Security: secure remote access for OT/ICS and its role in industrial cybersecurity
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern remote access in OT and ICS environments?
A: They should govern OT remote access as a session-bound control plane, not as generic connectivity.
Q: Why does secure remote access matter more in OT than in standard IT environments?
A: OT environments contain legacy assets, fragile protocols, and safety-critical processes that cannot tolerate broad, persistent access.
Q: What breaks when OT access is handled like a normal VPN connection?
A: A normal VPN model creates too much reach for an environment where access should be tightly scoped by asset, protocol, and time.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every OT remote access path Document which users, contractors, and support vendors can reach each Purdue layer, then remove any direct route that bypasses the brokered access tier.
- Replace standing admin access with short-lived sessions Issue time-bound access for maintenance and change windows, with protocol-specific rules that limit each session to the exact industrial service required.
- Centralise session monitoring and audit evidence Send live session logs, command history, and anomaly alerts into a shared review process so operations and security can correlate access with plant changes.
What's in the full report
SSH Communications Security's full analysis covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Protocol-by-protocol OT access coverage for SSH, RDP, VNC, HTTPS, Modbus, OPC UA, and DNP3.
- Deployment guidance for on-premises, Kubernetes, and air-gapped industrial environments.
- Live session monitoring, forensic logging, and compliance-oriented access evidence for industrial operations.
- How PrivX OT aligns with identity management, SIEM, and SOAR workflows in mixed IT/OT estates.
👉 Read SSH Communications Security's analysis of secure remote access for OT/ICS →
Secure remote access for OT/ICS - what IAM teams need to know?
Explore further
08/06/2026 9:05 am
Secure remote access for OT is a control plane, not a transport feature. The article reinforces a basic industrial security reality: once IT and OT converge, the access layer becomes the place where operational continuity and attack containment meet. In that model, identity, session policy, and protocol awareness matter more than raw connectivity. Practitioners should treat remote access as governed execution, not mere administration.
A few things that frame the scale:
- The average estimated time to remediate a leaked secret is 27 days, despite 75% of organisations expressing strong confidence in their secrets management capabilities, according to The State of Secrets in AppSec.
- Only 44% of developers are reported to follow security best practices for secrets management, exposing a significant developer behaviour gap.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Which frameworks should teams use to assess OT secure remote access governance?
A: Teams should align OT remote access with IEC 62443, NERC CIP, and NIS2 where applicable, then map identity and access controls to zero-trust principles and session monitoring requirements. The right assessment asks whether each connection is attributable, limited in scope, and revocable fast enough to protect plant operations.
👉 Read our full editorial: Secure remote access for OT/ICS is now an identity problem
