Topic starter
11/06/2026 11:21 pm
TL;DR: Disconnected systems, legacy platforms and shadow SaaS are leaving identities outside central governance, while unmanaged non-human accounts and shared credentials create persistent access risk across complex environments, according to Gathid. Holistic discovery, contextual data and localised cleanup are now essential because identity risk increasingly lives beyond the systems IAM teams already monitor.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Gathid: “Mitigating Identity Risks: Managing Access Across Diverse Systems”.
Key questions
Q: How should teams govern access in disconnected systems that do not integrate with IAM?
A: Teams should treat disconnected systems as first-class governance targets, not exceptions.
Q: Why do legacy platforms and shadow SaaS create persistent access risk?
A: They often bypass the normal joiner-mover-leaver and recertification cycle.
Q: What are the signs that identity governance is failing outside the core IAM stack?
A: Look for systems with no named owner, access lists that are updated by hand, accounts that survive after departures, and departmental tools that never appear in recertification reports.
Practitioner guidance
- Map every disconnected access island Build a complete inventory of systems that grant access outside the core IAM stack, including local directories, shadow SaaS, remote-site applications and manually managed subscriptions.
- Pull authoritative context into review decisions Join identity records to HR, asset and contract data so that role changes, vendor changes and leaver events can invalidate access even when the target system is not centrally integrated.
- Bring machine identities into lifecycle governance Assign owners, expiry dates and review cadences to service accounts, API credentials and automation scripts before they become permanent blind spots.
Bottom line: The article shows that the biggest access risk often sits in systems that IAM teams do not centrally govern, including shadow SaaS, legacy tools and local accounts.
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This topic was modified 1 day ago by NHI Mgmt Group
12/06/2026 7:58 am
Identity governance breaks first at the edge, not in the core. Central IAM programmes often mature around HR-backed user populations and flagship SaaS, but the article shows that unmanaged access accumulates where integrations are weak and ownership is diffuse. That includes legacy tools, departmental subscriptions and externally funded services that never enter standard lifecycle processes. Practitioners should treat the edge as the primary governance gap, not a secondary exception.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 92% of organisations expose NHIs to third parties, raising concerns about supply chain security, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do when machine identities have no clear owner or expiry?
A: Give every service account, API credential and automation identity an owner, a purpose and an expiry expectation. If the platform cannot support full automation, set a manual review and removal process. Machine identities without accountability become persistent access paths, especially in legacy and third-party systems.
👉 Read our full editorial: Unmanaged identities in shadow systems are widening access risk
This post was modified 1 day ago by NHI Mgmt Group