Shared ward devices: are passkeys the right factor?

TL;DR: Passkeys and other FIDO2 credentials work well for a person on a dedicated device, but hospital wards expose the weak assumptions behind synced credentials, shared Windows accounts, and device-bound biometrics, according to Crayonic. The control question is not whether passkeys are strong, but whether the identity, device, and session model still match shared clinical use.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Crayonic: “A passkey belongs to one person. A ward computer belongs to everyone.”.

Key questions

Q: How should teams deploy passkeys on shared workstations?

A: Use a shared-device policy, not a blanket passwordless policy.

Q: Why do synced passkeys create governance problems for corporate accounts?

A: Synced passkeys can escape the organisation’s control when they land in a personal cloud account that IT cannot inspect or revoke.

Q: What signs show passwordless controls are being used in the wrong context?

A: Watch for shared Windows accounts, multiple staff using the same sign-in profile, unclear ownership of enrolled credentials, and policies that assume a device is personal when it is actually communal.

Practitioner guidance

• Map passkey rollout by device ownership Classify endpoints as dedicated, shared, or kiosk-like before deciding where passkeys are acceptable and where they are not.
• Separate account lifecycle from device lifecycle Define who can enroll, revoke, and recover synced passkeys when the credential is attached to a cloud account rather than a local workstation.
• Prefer roaming authenticators for communal workstations Issue portable authenticators where many users share the same PC so the credential remains tied to the person, not the shared device.

Bottom line: Passkeys do not remove the need to model who owns the device, account, and session in a shared environment.

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