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24/06/2026 8:04 pm
TL;DR: Telecom security laws in the UK, EU, Australia, and Singapore now require temporary privileged access, complete audit trails, and continuous monitoring, yet traditional IGA and PAM tools typically see only 20-30% of actual access, according to Hydden. The real gap is visibility, because compliance fails when security teams cannot discover the accounts and access paths regulators expect them to govern.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Hydden: telecom security regulation and identity governance across the UK, EU, Australia, and Singapore
By the numbers:
- Traditional Identity Governance and Administration tools typically see only 20-30% of actual access due to limited connectors.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should telecom providers govern privileged access across legacy and cloud environments?
A: They should treat privileged access as a single governance problem across routers, switches, mainframes, cloud platforms, and DevOps tools.
Q: Why do telecom environments expose gaps in traditional IGA and PAM coverage?
A: Telecom environments mix decades of legacy infrastructure with modern cloud and supplier access, so standard connectors rarely see the full entitlement set.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about third-party access in telecom?
A: They often treat supplier access as a contract issue instead of an identity governance issue.
Practitioner guidance
- Build a telecom-wide identity inventory Discover accounts across network infrastructure, legacy systems, cloud platforms, DevOps tools, and supplier environments before recertification begins.
- Tie privileged access to named business purpose Require each elevated session to map to a specific ticket, operator, and security critical function.
- Extend review campaigns to third-party identities Include vendor accounts, shared supplier credentials, and managed service access in the same certification workflow as internal accounts.
What's in the full article
Hydden's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A region-by-region breakdown of the UK TSA, NIS2, SOCI, and Singapore telecom requirements
- Detailed examples of how identity intelligence supports audit evidence across legacy and cloud estates
- Operational descriptions of how discovery feeds PAM and IGA coverage gaps
- Supplier-access monitoring and segmentation practices for telecom environments
👉 Read Hydden's analysis of telecom identity governance and regulatory compliance →
Telecom compliance and identity visibility: where IAM teams are missing risk?
Explore further
25/06/2026 5:13 am
Telecom compliance is now an identity visibility problem, not a policy problem. The article shows that modern telecom regulation assumes complete knowledge of who and what can reach security-critical functions. Traditional IGA and PAM controls fail when they cover only part of the environment, because the compliance burden is tied to discovery, not just enforcement. Practitioners should treat incomplete discovery as the primary control gap.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Another signal: 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, which broadens the attack surface when telecom estates cannot inventory every account, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when telecom identity controls fail regulatory review?
A: Accountability sits with the organisation that owns the regulated service, even when access is delivered through a supplier or a legacy platform. Frameworks such as NIS2 and the UK Telecommunications Security Act expect demonstrable control, not shared blame. The team accountable for evidence is the team accountable for compliance.
👉 Read our full editorial: Telecom security regulation exposes the limits of legacy IAM tools
