Topic starter
24/10/2026 8:49 pm
TL;DR: eIDAS 2.0 issuers must verify both Wallet Instance Attestation and Wallet Unit Attestation before issuing credentials, so they can trust the wallet app, device state, and hardware-bound keys, according to Procivis. The governance shift is from trusting the request to verifying the runtime and storage environment first.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Procivis: “Wallet Instance and Wallet Unit Attestation (WIA & WUA) Explained”.
Key questions
Q: How should issuers validate a digital wallet before issuing high-assurance credentials?
A: Issuers should require proof that the wallet app is authentic, running on a trusted device state, and backed by secure key storage before binding sensitive credentials.
Q: Why do hardware-bound wallet keys reduce credential risk?
A: Hardware-bound keys reduce risk because they cannot be exported or easily cloned for reuse on another device.
Q: What breaks when wallet attestation is treated as a single control?
A: You lose the distinction between short-lived software integrity and longer-lived key custody, which are different governance problems.
Practitioner guidance
- Require attestation before issuance Make Wallet Instance Attestation and Wallet Unit Attestation mandatory checkpoints before any sensitive credential is issued to a wallet.
- Separate app and hardware trust decisions Write policy so software integrity, supported device state, and hardware-bound key custody are evaluated as distinct conditions instead of one combined trust score.
- Define revocation triggers for wallet trust Set explicit revocation handling for lost or compromised devices and align token status checks with the wallet unit’s trust lifetime.
Bottom line: The article shows that eIDAS 2.0 wallet issuance depends on explicit trust checks for both the app and the device-backed key store.
Explore further
View Full Forum → | NHI Foundation Course → | Our Services → | Read the full analysis →