Topic starter
22/07/2026 4:37 pm
TL;DR: Zero trust network security tools work by continuously verifying identity, device posture, context, and policy, but the article argues the real gap is that many programmes still leave standing privileged access in place, according to Apono's guide. The governance challenge is not just perimeter replacement, but removing persistent access before zero trust becomes a label rather than a control model.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Apono: “15 Best Zero Trust Network Security Tools [By Category]”.
By the numbers:
- 22% of breaches involved credential abuse as the initial access vector.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when zero trust IAM still allows standing privileges?
A: Standing privileges break the core zero trust assumption that access should be continuously evaluated and bounded to the current task.
Q: Why do standing privileges increase breach impact in cloud and enterprise environments?
A: Standing privileges enlarge the attacker’s options because one exposed administrative path can be reused for lateral movement, persistence, or broad operational control.
Q: How do teams know whether zero trust controls are actually reducing privilege?
A: A useful test is whether access disappears when the work is done.
Practitioner guidance
- Replace standing privileged access with JIT issuance Review production, database, and internal application access paths and move high-risk entitlements to time-bound grants that expire automatically after the task ends.
- Separate ZTNA from privilege reduction Map which access tools control connection path only and which ones actually remove persistent privilege, then close the gaps where network controls are masking standing access.
- Reclassify privileged access as a zero trust dependency Treat infra consoles, internal admin portals, and sensitive data stores as governance-critical access points, not just application connectivity problems.
Bottom line: Zero trust network security tools do not solve the access problem if standing permissions remain active underneath them.
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This topic was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
22/07/2026 4:43 pm
Standing access is the control failure zero trust often leaves behind. The article’s central tension is that organisations can adopt zero trust language while still allowing broad, persistent permissions underneath it. That means the governance problem is not trust at login alone, but privilege that survives after the original need has passed. Practitioners should treat persistent access as the real exposure point, because that is where zero trust design usually stops short.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations prioritise just-in-time access over network segmentation?
A: They solve different problems, so the priority depends on the risk being reduced. If the issue is excessive entitlement to production systems, just-in-time access should come first because it removes privilege. If the issue is east-west movement after compromise, segmentation matters more. Many programmes need both, in different layers.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero trust network security tools still hinge on standing access
This post was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group