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08/06/2026 4:13 pm
TL;DR: Zero Trust differs from Defense in Depth by requiring continuous verification of every user and device, while layered controls in DiD can leave organizations with a broader attack surface and false confidence, according to Axiad. For IAM teams, the real issue is whether identity governance still assumes trust can be inferred from network position, perimeter layers, or a one-time check.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Axiad: Zero Trust vs. Defense in Depth: What's the Difference?
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams choose between Zero Trust and Defense in Depth for identity governance?
A: Use Zero Trust when the main risk is stale trust, lateral movement, or identity-driven access across cloud and SaaS systems.
Q: Why do service accounts and API keys weaken Defense in Depth models?
A: Service accounts and API keys weaken Defense in Depth when they retain access long after the original approval point.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about Zero Trust in practice?
A: Teams often treat Zero Trust as a network design project instead of an identity governance model.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory where trust is granted once Map every place where access is approved at entry and then left unchanged, including SSO sessions, service account permissions, API tokens, and internal network trust zones.
- Unify identity signals across control layers Tie authentication, authorisation, device posture, and secret lifecycle into one policy model so that layered defenses do not drift apart.
- Reduce standing privilege before expanding layers Cut persistent access that survives beyond the task or session, then verify that segmentation and monitoring are enforcing the reduced privilege model.
What's in the full article
Axiad's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How Axiad frames the differences between continuous verification and layered defense in real identity environments.
- The specific user-experience trade-offs the article associates with Zero Trust adoption.
- The article's vendor-specific interpretation of implementation complexity in large organizations.
- Axiad's recommended Zero Trust authentication model positioning for readers evaluating adoption.
👉 Read Axiad's comparison of Zero Trust and Defense in Depth for identity security →
Zero trust vs defense in depth: what identity teams should change?
Explore further
08/06/2026 5:44 pm
Zero Trust works because it rejects the core assumption that identity can be trusted after a single approval. Defense in Depth often assumes that enough layers will compensate for a one-time trust decision, but that assumption breaks when identity context changes continuously across cloud, SaaS, and machine access. The implication is that identity governance must be treated as a runtime discipline, not a perimeter event.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which leaves most machine identities outside effective governance.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when layered security fails but identity trust was never rechecked?
A: Accountability sits with the teams that own identity policy, access governance, and runtime verification, not only with perimeter defenders. When trust is granted once and never reassessed, the failure is architectural as well as operational. Frameworks such as NIST CSF and Zero Trust governance make that shared responsibility explicit.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero trust vs defence in depth for identity governance
