Topic starter
16/01/2026 5:37 pm
TL;DR: Network segmentation still limits traffic paths, but it does not address identity-driven attacks that exploit compromised credentials and static, device-based policies, according to Silverfort. Identity segmentation shifts control to identities, roles, and attributes, which makes Zero Trust more precise and exposes where legacy network boundaries no longer protect access decisions.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Silverfort: “Identity Segmentation: A Key Pillar in Bolstering Security Posture”.
Key questions
Q: Why does network segmentation alone fail to stop identity based attacks?
A: Network segmentation reduces exposure, but it cannot stop an attacker who already has valid credentials or a misconfigured identity.
Q: Why do identity-based access controls matter more than network location in Zero Trust?
A: Because Zero Trust is meant to evaluate the request, not the address.
Q: What signs show that segmentation is too dependent on the network layer?
A: Common signs include broad access tied to subnet membership, firewall rules that mirror office topology, and the same permissions applying to very different users or devices.
Practitioner guidance
- Reframe segmentation around identity decisions Map your highest-value resources to identity, role, and attribute conditions instead of assuming IP ranges and VLANs are enough to express access intent.
- Find broad access inherited from network location Review where users receive access simply because they sit inside a trusted subnet or firewall zone, then document where that location-based trust exceeds role need.
- Tie Zero Trust to the identity control plane Use identity-aware policy as the centre of Zero Trust design so devices, users, applications, and workloads are evaluated on context rather than network adjacency.
Bottom line: Identity segmentation addresses a governance gap that network segmentation cannot cover because authenticated access can still be overbroad.
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This topic was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
06/10/2026 11:47 pm
Identity segmentation is the missing control layer when Zero Trust stops at the network boundary. The article is correct that modern environments no longer fail only at the perimeter; they fail at the identity decision point. When access policy is still anchored to network zones, the programme protects traffic paths but leaves identity-based access decisions under-governed. That means Zero Trust remains incomplete until identity becomes the control surface.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should IAM teams replace network segmentation with identity segmentation?
A: No. They should use network segmentation for traffic containment and identity segmentation for access control. The two serve different purposes. The practical decision is to keep network boundaries as a supporting control while moving authorisation logic into the identity plane.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity segmentation is the missing layer in zero trust controls