Topic starter
07/03/2026 1:06 am
TL;DR: Traditional 2FA/MFA still depends on shared secrets, second-device approvals, and channels like SMS that attackers can intercept or pressure users into approving, according to Beyond Identity. Passwordless authentication shifts assurance to device-bound asymmetric cryptography and removes passwords from the attack path, making access governance materially harder to bypass.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Beyond Identity: “Traditional Two-Factor Authentication vs. Beyond Identity’s Passwordless Authentication”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when multi-factor authentication still relies on SMS codes or push approvals?
A: Traditional MFA can fail when attackers intercept one-time codes, trick users into approving prompts, or exploit push fatigue.
Q: Why do passwordless methods reduce phishing risk more than traditional MFA?
A: Passwordless reduces phishing risk because it removes the reusable password that attackers most often steal or replay.
Q: What are the signs that an MFA programme is too easy for attackers to bypass?
A: A weak MFA programme usually depends on reusable codes, SMS, or voice calls, and it may still allow access after phishing attempts or credential theft.
Practitioner guidance
- Replace SMS and OTP approvals for high-risk access Move privileged and sensitive workforce access away from phone-based second factors that can be intercepted, reused, or fatigue-approved.
- Adopt device-bound passwordless for critical users Use phishing-resistant authentication that relies on asymmetric cryptography and secure hardware on the endpoint.
- Reassess your strong-authentication policy Check whether your policy equates MFA with actual resistance to interception and push fatigue.
Bottom line: Traditional 2FA/MFA can still be bypassed when the second factor is a transferable code or a user-approved prompt.
Explore further
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This topic was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
08/10/2026 4:58 pm
Traditional MFA is still a shared-secret control with a veneer of extra assurance. If the first factor is a password and the second factor is a code or approval sent through a reachable channel, the system still depends on secrets that can be intercepted, replayed, or socially engineered. That makes the control easier to bypass than teams often assume, especially for high-value accounts. Practitioners should treat this as a residual trust problem, not as solved authentication.
A few things that frame the scale:
- eBay's passkey data shows 55-60% of passkey adoption happens on mobile, against around 20% on desktop.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations replace MFA with passwordless authentication?
A: Organisations should not treat this as a simple replacement question. MFA is still useful where passwordless is not yet available, but passwordless raises the security baseline by removing the password as the primary failure point. The right path is to use MFA as a bridge and passwordless as the destination.
👉 Read our full editorial: Traditional 2FA/MFA is not enough for passwordless identity