Topic starter
23/03/2026 2:31 pm
TL;DR: Telecom regulation is now mandating temporary privileged access, continuous monitoring, and supplier visibility across the UK, EU, Australia, and Singapore, but traditional IGA and PAM tools still miss large parts of the estate, according to Hydden. The real issue is not policy intent but discovery: you cannot govern access you cannot reliably inventory.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Hydden: “How Identity Intelligence Drives Telecom Regulatory Compliance”.
By the numbers:
- Traditional Identity Governance and Administration tools typically see only 20-30% of actual access due to limited connectors.
- The UK Telecommunications Security Act passed in November 2021, with enforcement beginning in October 2022.
Key questions
Q: Where do telecom identity controls fail when the estate includes legacy systems and supplier access?
A: They fail when review and monitoring programmes depend on incomplete inventories.
Q: Why does telecom regulation make incomplete identity visibility a compliance risk?
A: Because the regulations described in the article require evidence over all privileged access, not just the subset managed inside one directory or PAM workflow.
Q: What do telecom teams get wrong about PAM coverage?
A: They often assume vaulting known admin accounts is enough, even when service accounts, local accounts and supplier credentials sit outside the workflow.
Practitioner guidance
- Expand identity inventory beyond directory-connected assets Map accounts, privileges and authentication paths across network equipment, legacy platforms, cloud services and DevOps tools before refreshing review campaigns.
- Test privileged access against regulatory time bounds Check whether administrators can self-grant access, whether tickets prove purpose, and whether open tickets are updated with current justification.
- Validate supplier access visibility end to end Confirm that contractor and vendor accounts are discovered, segregated and monitored even when they do not pass through your PAM workflow.
Bottom line: Telecom security regulation has moved access governance from a directory problem to an estate-wide discovery problem.
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11/10/2026 1:14 am
Telecom identity governance has become a discovery problem before it is a control problem. The regulations cited in the article assume organisations can see every account, privilege path and third-party dependency that touches security critical functions. Traditional IGA and PAM programmes were designed for narrower estates, so the first failure is incomplete visibility rather than weak policy. The practitioner conclusion is simple: governance cannot certify what inventory cannot prove exists.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should security teams validate third-party access claims?
A: They should require evidence that matches the claim, such as access logs, certification records, revocation proof, or audit artefacts. A vendor saying it enforces least privilege is not enough; teams need proof that the access model is actually in place and remains current throughout the relationship.
👉 Read our full editorial: Telecom security regulations expose the limits of legacy identity tools