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23/06/2026 9:21 pm
TL;DR: Enterprises are accumulating IAM, IGA, PAM, directory, and NHI tools that each model identity differently, creating fragmented visibility and unmanaged aliasing across systems, according to AuthMind. The real problem is not account volume but broken correlation, which leaves privilege escalation paths and shadow access hidden from governance.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by AuthMind: identity sprawl and the mechanics of identity observability
By the numbers:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams reduce identity sprawl across human and machine accounts?
A: Start by building a unified identity inventory that links each account to one owner, one purpose, and one environment.
Q: Why do synchronised identity systems still leave risk behind?
A: Because synchronisation moves data between systems without proving that each record refers to the same actor.
Q: What do teams get wrong about shadow access?
A: They often treat shadow access as a discovery problem only, when it is also a correlation problem.
Practitioner guidance
- Map duplicate identities across systems Inventory every human, service account, and agentic identity across directory, cloud, PAM, and local systems, then reconcile aliases to one accountable owner.
- Audit shadow accounts and local admins Search for unmanaged local accounts, dormant production IDs, and non-directory admin access that survive offboarding or bypass PAM controls.
- Correlate activity with ownership records Require every privileged action to resolve back to a named owner, creator, or operator, especially where non-human identities are involved.
What's in the full article
AuthMind's full analysis covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- How the vendor defines identity observability as a control plane across IAM, IGA, PAM, and NHI environments
- Examples of duplicate identity patterns across directories, cloud platforms, and local systems
- Operational detail on mapping agentic AI and NHI accounts back to the human who created them
- The specific visibility and correlation failures the vendor uses to illustrate privilege bypass and shadow access
👉 Read AuthMind's analysis of identity sprawl and identity observability →
Identity sprawl and correlation gaps: what IAM teams are missing?
Explore further
25/06/2026 2:37 am
Identity sprawl is a governance failure before it is a tooling failure. Enterprises often describe the problem as too many identities, but the deeper issue is that the same actor is represented inconsistently across IAM, PAM, IGA, cloud, and local systems. When those records cannot be correlated, ownership, privilege, and activity stop lining up, and governance becomes partial by design. That means the control objective is not just centralisation but identity truth across environments.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do organisations know whether identity observability is working?
A: It is working when every privileged event can be traced back to one accountable identity across systems, including aliases and non-human accounts. If reviews still rely on separate tool reports and manual reconciliation, the organisation has visibility, but not correlation.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity sprawl is breaking correlation across human and machine access
