TL;DR: Certificate management is increasingly tied to privileged access risk because credentials used to operate certificates can expand blast radius, create audit gaps, and enable theft or misuse, according to Delinea. The governance issue is not certificates alone but the assumption that machine identities can be managed safely in separate workflows from the rest of identity.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Delinea: “Fast, unified PAM and Certificate Lifecycle Management”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when certificate lifecycle management sits outside PAM?
A: Teams lose a consistent view of who can renew, deploy, and rotate certificates, which creates audit gaps and policy drift.
Q: Why do certificate credentials increase privileged access risk?
A: Because the credentials that operate certificates often grant access to trust infrastructure, renewal workflows, or shared keys used across multiple systems.
Q: How do organisations know whether certificate governance is actually working?
A: Look for complete inventory coverage, named ownership, timely renewal, documented revocation, and evidence that expired or unused certificates are removed quickly.
Practitioner guidance
- Converge certificate and PAM governance Bring certificate renewal, deployment, and revocation under the same approval, logging, and review model used for other privileged access paths.
- Inventory certificate keys as privileged credentials Map which keys unlock certificate operations, where they are stored, and which teams or systems can access them.
- Reduce shared access paths Limit the number of people, scripts, and services that can touch certificate management credentials, especially where one key unlocks multiple certificates.
Bottom line: Certificate lifecycle management becomes a privileged access issue when the credentials used to operate certificates are governed outside the rest of identity.
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Certificate lifecycle management is now a PAM problem because the control plane sits around the certificate, not inside it. Delinea’s article correctly shifts attention from the certificate object to the credentials and workflows that renew, deploy, and rotate it. Once those actions require elevated access, the governance model is no longer simple asset administration. Practitioners should treat certificate operations as privileged access paths subject to the same oversight as other high-risk identity functions.
A few things that frame the scale:
- NHIs outnumber human identities by 25x to 50x in modern enterprises, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: When should organisations prioritise automation over manual certificate handling?
A: Automation should be the default once an organisation manages more than a small number of certificates, because scale makes manual renewal unreliable. The turning point is not a specific count, but the moment certificates span teams, tools, and infrastructure layers that no single person can track safely.
👉 Read our full editorial: Certificate lifecycle management is now a privileged access problem