TL;DR: Akeyless finds identity security now sits at the centre of cloud defence because attackers are logging in with stolen credentials, abusing over-permissioned accounts, and exploiting secrets sprawl. The problem is no longer perimeter loss but continuous control over human and machine identities, secrets, and privilege boundaries.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Akeyless: “What Is Identity Security and Why It Matters for Businesses”.
By the numbers:
- 69% of organizations have experienced an identity-related breach in the last three years.
- 39% of secrets exposed in public git repositories are for web application infrastructure.
- 32% of secrets exposed in public git repositories are for development CI/CD.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when API security is treated as a perimeter problem instead of an identity problem?
A: Controls miss the real attack path, which now often begins with valid credentials and moves through excessive authorization.
Q: Why does over-permissioned identity access create such a high breach risk in modern environments?
A: Over-permissioned access increases breach risk because attackers often succeed by logging in with valid credentials rather than breaking technical controls.
Q: How do security teams know when secret sprawl is becoming unmanageable?
A: When they cannot confidently answer where each secret exists, which workloads depend on it, and how quickly it can be retired without breaking business services.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit over-permissioned cloud identities Map human, service, and workload identities to the privileges they actually use, then remove broad rights that are not required for current tasks.
- Rotate exposed secrets on a lifecycle basis Treat secrets in code repositories, CI/CD systems, and cloud automation as revocable identity artefacts and replace any that cannot be proven current.
- Separate administrative access from routine access Keep privileged functions behind dedicated accounts or tightly scoped roles so a stolen credential cannot immediately become a full environment compromise.
Bottom line: Identity security now determines whether cloud access remains contained or becomes a direct route into production systems.
What's in the full article
Akeyless' full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The article’s full comparison of IAM, PAM, secrets management, machine identity management, and IGA.
- The specific cloud-native patterns it names for AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, and OIDC integration.
- The source’s detailed explanation of secretless architecture and contextual access for stateless workloads.
- The practical feature list for evaluating platforms that centralise human and machine identity governance.
👉 Read Akeyless' analysis of identity security for cloud enterprises →
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Identity security has become the cloud control plane because trust now travels with the identity itself. The old perimeter model assumed that network location signalled trustworthiness, but cloud workloads, APIs, and automation break that assumption. When valid credentials are enough to reach production, the security problem is governance of identity state, not network edge denial. Practitioners should treat identity as the primary enforcement layer across human and machine access paths.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should IAM and NHI teams do when cloud access depends on stored secrets?
A: They should prioritise secretless or short-lived access patterns wherever cloud platforms support them, and reserve stored secrets only for tightly governed exceptions. The goal is to reduce the number of reusable bearer credentials that can be stolen, copied, or left behind in automation. That lowers both exposure and cleanup burden.
👉 Read our full editorial: Identity security is now the frontline for cloud enterprises