Topic starter
28/04/2026 4:21 pm
TL;DR: One-time passwords reduce the impact of stolen passwords by adding a single-use second factor, but they remain vulnerable to phishing, SIM swapping, and interception, according to Ping Identity. The control is useful as a fallback, yet it no longer meets the assurance bar for sensitive actions where passkeys and risk-based MFA are available.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Ping Identity: “One-Time Passwords Explained: How They Work & Common Use Cases”.
Key questions
Q: Should organisations replace passwords with OTPs everywhere?
A: Not automatically. OTPs reduce password storage burden and short-lived code reuse risk, but they do not solve device loss, delivery failure, inbox compromise, or phishing on their own. The better decision is to apply OTP where the user experience fits and where the organisation can tolerate the assurance level it actually provides.
Q: Why are SMS OTP codes considered weaker than authenticator apps?
A: SMS depends on the mobile network and phone number, so it is exposed to SIM swapping, message interception, and number takeover.
Q: What are the best practices for using OTP in MFA programmes?
A: Use OTP only where it fits the risk level, pair it with stronger factors for sensitive access, and document which journeys depend on each delivery method.
Practitioner guidance
- Define OTP as a fallback factor Classify OTP as acceptable only for low-risk login, compatibility, or recovery flows where stronger methods are unavailable or not yet deployed.
- Phase sensitive journeys to phishing-resistant methods Move privileged actions and high-value transactions to passkeys, hardware keys, or device-bound biometrics instead of channel-delivered codes.
- Review OTP delivery channels for exposure Treat SMS, email, and voice as separate risk paths and document which journeys depend on carrier, mailbox, or phone-number trust.
Bottom line: OTP still reduces the value of stolen passwords, but it should be treated as a fallback factor rather than the primary answer for sensitive access.
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11/10/2026 2:20 am
OTP is now a fallback control, not an assurance endpoint: The article correctly places one-time passwords in a support role beside passkeys and biometric-backed authentication. That is the right governance shift for human IAM because a code that can be intercepted or socially engineered cannot carry the assurance burden for sensitive actions. Practitioners should stop treating OTP as the default strong factor and classify it by the risk level of the journey.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 19% of organisations give AI systems dramatically more access than human employees, nearly one in five granting unrestricted privilege, according to the 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do security teams decide if OTP is good enough for a login flow?
A: Compare the authentication method to the value of the account, the sensitivity of the action, and the likelihood of phishing or interception. If the journey involves admin rights, payment approval, or other high-impact activity, OTP alone is rarely sufficient. If the flow is low risk or legacy-bound, OTP may be acceptable as a transitional control.
👉 Read our full editorial: One-time passwords still matter, but only as a fallback factor