Topic starter
22/01/2026 3:41 pm
TL;DR: Unified IGA, IAM and PAM can centralize policy, provisioning, and privileged access, but the source article shows that identity governance still depends on visibility, lifecycle discipline, and third-party controls. According to SafePaaS, 87% of respondents view IAM as very to extremely important to risk posture, 77% report some users have more access than needed, and 76% saw reduced unauthorized access after using IAM. The governance gap is now in non-human identity scope, not just human access control.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SafePaaS: “The definitive guide to modern identity and access management – Unified IGA, IAM, and PAM”.
By the numbers:
- 87% view IAM as very to extremely important to their risk management and security posture.
- 77% have at least a few users with more access privileges than required for their jobs.
- 76% of organizations saw a reduction in unauthorized access from using an IAM solution.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when IGA and PAM do not cover non-human identities?
A: Governance breaks at the point where human-centric lifecycle controls meet service accounts, APIs and system credentials.
Q: Why do over-entitled accounts keep showing up in mature IAM programmes?
A: Because provisioning speed is usually higher than review and offboarding speed.
Q: How should security teams govern vendor access across the third-party lifecycle?
A: Security teams should govern vendor access as a lifecycle, not a one-time approval.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory non-human identities alongside human accounts Map service accounts, system accounts, APIs, contractor credentials and third-party identities into the same governance model used for employees.
- Tie third-party access to lifecycle offboarding Require every external identity to have an owner, an expiry condition and a removal workflow that is tested during vendor exit and contract change.
- Reconcile certification to actual privilege scope Compare the privileges users and non-human accounts actually hold with the access their role, process or integration still requires.
Bottom line: Unified IAM does not automatically cover machine identities, so service accounts and APIs can remain outside the governance model even when human access looks mature.
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06/10/2026 3:28 pm
Unified identity platforms centralize control, but centralization alone does not close the NHI governance gap. IGA, IAM and PAM were designed to coordinate policy, provisioning and elevated access for a broad estate, yet the article itself shows that service accounts, APIs and third parties still fall through operational cracks. The practical conclusion is that a single identity platform is not the same thing as complete identity coverage.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 36% of health IT leaders say their organisation applies a privileged access strategy consistently across the enterprise, according to Ponemon Institute research.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations prioritise visibility or privileged session control first?
A: Visibility comes first when the identity estate is incomplete, because you cannot govern what you cannot inventory. Privileged session control matters immediately for high-risk access, but it only manages the accounts you already know about. Mature programmes need both, with visibility driving scope and PAM controlling exposure.
👉 Read our full editorial: Unified IGA, IAM and PAM leave the NHI governance gap exposed