TL;DR: APIs now function as unmanaged identities in many enterprises, with static keys, shared secrets, and long-lived permissions creating a trust gap that human-focused IAM does not close, according to Abnormal AI. Treating API access as identity governance, not plumbing, is now a prerequisite for least privilege and Zero Trust consistency.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Abnormal AI: “If Every User Needs an Identity, Why Don’t Our APIs?”.
Key questions
Q: When do API security controls fail in practice?
A: They fail when authentication is weak, scopes are too broad, endpoints are exposed without validation, or secrets are copied into too many places to revoke quickly.
Q: Why are long-lived API keys a higher-risk credential type for modern application access?
A: Long-lived API keys create risk because they persist far beyond a single task or session, which expands the window for theft and misuse.
Q: How should security teams govern API access as a non-human identity?
A: Security teams should inventory APIs as identities, assign an accountable owner, and enforce lifecycle controls for issuance, rotation, expiry, and revocation.
Practitioner guidance
- Define every API as a governed identity Assign a named owner, purpose, and lifecycle state to each API key, token, and service connection so access can be reviewed and revoked like any other identity.
- Replace standing API privilege with JIT issuance Scope access to the task, issue credentials only when needed, and revoke them automatically once the operation completes or the trust condition expires.
- Remove shared secrets from integration paths Eliminate reused keys and untracked service accounts from application and pipeline workflows, then re-issue them through managed lifecycle processes.
Bottom line: APIs create identity risk when they are allowed to operate with implicit, persistent trust outside the normal IAM model.
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APIs have become unmanaged identities, not auxiliary technical endpoints. The article is right to treat API keys, tokens, and service connections as identities because they create durable trust relationships that behave like accounts, not sockets. That changes the governance problem from traffic control to identity control. Practitioners should stop assuming that machine access can be safely left outside the identity programme.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 30.9% of organisations store long-term credentials directly in code, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What does just-in-time access change for API governance?
A: It changes the default state from persistent trust to temporary trust. Instead of assuming an API should stay authorized until manually removed, the organisation issues narrow access for a defined purpose and removes it automatically when that purpose ends.
👉 Read our full editorial: Just-in-time identity for APIs is becoming an IAM control gap