TL;DR: Fragmented API management and identity controls create manual key handling, inconsistent token use, and hidden exposure for machine-to-machine access, according to Kong. Unifying those functions can reduce operational drag, but the core security problem is still governance of application identity, not just easier connectivity.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Kong: Merge API Management & Identity to Unlock Your API Platform's Potential
By the numbers:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern API keys and tokens as machine identities?
A: Treat every API key, client secret, and token as an identity with an owner, scope, expiry, and revocation path.
Q: Why do separate API and identity systems create security risk?
A: Separate systems create duplicate policy logic, inconsistent token handling, and weak visibility into who can still access what.
Q: What do organisations get wrong about machine-to-machine access?
A: They often treat it as a connectivity problem instead of an identity problem.
Practitioner guidance
- Map machine identities to owners and expiry dates Build an inventory of every API key, client secret, and token issuer, then assign a business owner, technical owner, and enforced expiry.
- Centralise token issuance and scope policy Move access decisions into a single gateway or authorisation layer so scopes, claims, audiences, and revocation logic are enforced consistently.
- Eliminate static credentials from source and shared channels Scan repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and collaboration tools for embedded secrets, then replace them with managed identity flows and short-lived credentials.
What's in the full article
Kong's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The specific Konnect and Kong Identity capabilities for defining clients, scopes, and claims
- How dynamic claim templates are applied in the platform for machine-to-machine requests
- The product-level explanation of how per-region authorization servers are configured and used
- The implementation view of how API gateway enforcement reduces backend authentication logic
👉 Read Kong's analysis of merging API management and identity for machine-to-machine security →
API management and identity: what it means for IAM teams?
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