Topic starter
25/06/2026 1:16 am
TL;DR: API authentication still relies on static keys and shared secrets in 84% of organisations, while one survey found only one of 68 companies had deployed a fully modern hardened approach, according to Raidiam’s 2025 API security profiling study. That leaves machine identities governed as if they were human logins, which is the wrong control model for NHI security.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Raidiam: “The API Security Gap: Why Most Enterprises Are Still Vulnerable”.
By the numbers:
- 84% of organisations rely on either bare API keys or basic shared secrets for API authentication.
- one out of 68 companies in that survey had implemented a fully modern, hardened API protection solution.
- An average API breach can leak up to 10× more data than a normal breach.
Key questions
Q: How should security teams reduce risk from static API keys in cloud-native environments?
A: Security teams should inventory every long-lived key, assign ownership, and replace broad reuse with task-scoped identity wherever possible.
Q: When is a simple API key no longer an acceptable control?
A: A simple key becomes hard to defend when the API touches sensitive data, privileged workflows, or external-facing integrations that can be copied across environments.
Q: What should teams look for to spot machine identity sprawl?
A: Look for duplicated secrets, shared keys used by multiple services, and credentials that remain valid after systems are changed or retired.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit hardcoded API keys Locate keys, shared secrets, and client secrets in code repositories, config stores, CI variables, and infrastructure manifests, then map each to an owning machine identity and business function.
- Replace shared secrets with proof-of-possession controls Move high-value API integrations to mTLS, certificate-bound tokens, or signed assertions so request authenticity depends on private key possession rather than reusable shared material.
- Tighten API scopes and entitlements Review what each machine identity can actually reach, then remove broad data access and privileged functions that are not required for the integration to operate.
Bottom line: API security gaps persist because many organisations still rely on static machine credentials that behave like permanent passwords.
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25/06/2026 10:35 am
Static machine credentials create identity debt: API keys and shared secrets are not just weak authentication choices, they are a persistence model for non-human identities. Once embedded in code or infrastructure, they outlive the decision that created them and become difficult to govern as living identities. The practitioner conclusion is simple: machine access has to be managed as a lifecycle, not a configuration flag.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Secrets management is a top five cybersecurity priority for only 33% of organisations, behind cloud security (45%), API security (42%), and endpoint security (36%), according to the 2024 State of Secrets Management Survey.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do certificate-based API controls change incident response?
A: They narrow the usefulness of a stolen secret because the attacker also needs the bound private key or certificate context to replay requests. That does not remove the incident, but it reduces how far a leaked credential can move before detection and containment.
👉 Read our full editorial: API security gaps expose machine identities to static credential abuse