Azure RBAC and Entra ID: where IGA tools miss effective access

TL;DR: Azure access is split between Microsoft Entra ID directory roles and Azure resource-level RBAC, so legacy IGA that stops at the directory misses standing privilege across subscriptions, resource groups, and resources, according to Oleria Security. Effective governance requires mapping humans, managed identities, and service principals against actual resource usage, not just assigned roles.

Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Oleria Security: “Identity security & governance for Microsoft Azure”.

Key questions

Q: Where does Azure access governance fail when teams only review Entra ID roles?

A: It fails at the resource layer.

Q: Why are managed identities and service principals high-risk in Azure RBAC reviews?

A: Because they often carry durable permissions that outlive the workload need they were created for.

Q: What do teams get wrong about access certification?

A: Teams often treat certification as proof that access is safe, when it is really only a decision process.

Practitioner guidance

• Map effective Azure access across both layers Review Microsoft Entra ID directory roles and Azure RBAC assignments together, including management groups, subscriptions, resource groups, and resources.
• Certify workload identities against current use Identify managed identities and service principals with Owner or Contributor roles, then compare their assigned scope to real activity and current workload need.
• Re-certify guest and partner access at the resource layer Check whether guest accounts and external collaborators still hold nested group memberships or direct resource permissions after the project or engagement has ended.

Bottom line: Azure governance breaks when teams treat Entra ID roles as the full picture and ignore resource-level RBAC.

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