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Topic starter
25/06/2026 10:34 pm
TL;DR: Connected cars expand the attack surface because onboard systems, software updates, and back-end services all depend on trusted device identity, and DigiCert argues PKI is the control layer that makes those exchanges verifiable and tamper-resistant. Encryption and code signing help, but without certificate-backed trust the vehicle remains another exposed endpoint.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by DigiCert: Connected Cars Need a Security Solution: Use PKI
By the numbers:
- Roughly a quarter billion connected cars will be on our roads by 2020.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should organisations secure connected cars with PKI?
A: Organisations should use PKI to authenticate vehicle components, sign firmware, and encrypt communications between the car and external services.
Q: Why do connected vehicles create machine identity risk?
A: Connected vehicles behave like distributed machine environments because dozens of onboard systems exchange data with external services and may be targeted through peripheral interfaces.
Q: What breaks when car software updates are not code signed?
A: Without code signing, the vehicle has no reliable way to verify who produced an update or whether it was altered before installation.
Practitioner guidance
- Define certificate-backed trust for every vehicle interface Map which vehicle-to-cloud, vehicle-to-vehicle, and internal subsystem exchanges require authenticated identity, then require certificates or equivalent cryptographic proof before allowing communication.
- Require signed firmware and authenticated over-the-air updates Block any software delivery path that cannot prove source integrity, and make signature verification part of the acceptance logic in the vehicle update pipeline.
- Treat vehicle components as managed machine identities Assign ownership, renewal, revocation, and retirement responsibilities for certificates used by embedded systems, telemetry services, and external integrations.
What's in the full article
DigiCert's full post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The article’s full discussion of certificate authority architecture and how it supports trusted device communication
- The specific automotive examples used to explain why infotainment separation alone does not solve trust
- The practical role of code signing in preventing tampered software from reaching vehicle systems
- The source article’s framing of PKI as a reusable security model for manufacturers, automakers, and connected services
👉 Read DigiCert's analysis of PKI for connected car security →
Connected car PKI: what it means for identity and device trust?
Explore further
25/06/2026 11:09 pm
Connected cars expose an identity problem disguised as a device problem. The article is correct to focus on PKI because the real issue is not connectivity alone but verifiable trust between many independently communicating systems. When vehicles exchange updates, commands, and telemetry across external networks, certificate-based identity becomes the minimum control that lets security teams distinguish authorised communication from spoofed traffic. Practitioners should treat connected vehicles as machine identities with lifecycle obligations, not as static hardware assets.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which is a reminder that unmanaged machine trust is usually a visibility problem before it becomes an incident.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable for certificate lifecycle in connected vehicle security?
A: The teams operating the vehicle platform, its update pipeline, and its connected services are accountable for certificate issuance, renewal, revocation, and retirement. If those responsibilities are unclear, trust persists after ownership changes and attack paths remain open. Lifecycle ownership is part of the security model, not a back-office detail.
👉 Read our full editorial: PKI is the missing trust layer for connected car security
