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06/09/2026 9:34 am
TL;DR: JWTs solve distributed authentication by removing server-side session state, but that same portability creates risk when tokens are reused, stored, or validated inconsistently across services, according to LEVO. Effective JWT security depends on strict signature checks, audience and issuer binding, short-lived tokens, and runtime visibility rather than blind trust in a valid token.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by LEVO: JWT security best practices and token misuse across distributed systems
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams handle JWTs that are reused across multiple services?
A: They should treat reuse as a trust-boundary problem, not a convenience feature.
Q: Why do valid JWTs still create security risk?
A: A valid signature only proves the token was issued by a trusted signer, not that it is being used in the right place or for the right purpose.
Q: What are the signs that JWT validation is failing in practice?
A: Look for decoded tokens being accepted without verification, inconsistent algorithm handling across services, and tokens being honoured by APIs that should never see them.
Practitioner guidance
- Enforce strict verification at every token boundary Require explicit issuer, audience, algorithm, and signature checks in each service that consumes a JWT.
- Bind tokens to the exact service context Treat audience claims as mandatory, not advisory, and reject tokens that arrive outside the workflow they were issued for.
- Shorten token lifetimes and define revocation paths Use short-lived access tokens, refresh token rotation, and key rotation so that compromise does not translate into durable access.
What's in the full article
LEVO's full article covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step JWT validation patterns for production services, including algorithm enforcement and claim checks.
- Practical token storage guidance for browser, API, and distributed-service environments.
- Revocation design options such as short-lived tokens, refresh rotation, and blacklist mechanics.
- Runtime visibility examples showing how tokens move across APIs in live environments.
👉 Read LEVO's analysis of JWT security best practices and token misuse →
JWT validation and token reuse: where IAM teams still get it wrong?
Explore further
06/09/2026 9:34 am
JWTs become an NHI governance problem the moment they are treated as portable credentials. A signed token is not a static proof of identity, it is a reusable trust artifact that can move across services and environments. That creates the same governance burden seen with other non-human identities: scope control, lifecycle control, and runtime visibility. Practitioners should stop treating JWT handling as only an application concern and manage it as credential governance.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91% of former employee tokens remain active after offboarding, leaving organisations vulnerable to potential security breaches, according to The 2025 State of NHIs and Secrets in Cybersecurity.
- 62% of all secrets are duplicated and stored in multiple locations, according to the same research, which is exactly the kind of sprawl that makes token governance harder.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do first when JWT revocation is difficult?
A: Start by reducing the damage window. Use shorter token lifetimes, rotate signing keys on a planned schedule, and add runtime monitoring so exposed tokens are discovered quickly. If high-risk workflows still depend on long-lived tokens, redesign those flows before the next exposure event.
👉 Read our full editorial: JWT security best practices fail when tokens outlive context
