Topic starter
06/07/2026 9:38 am
TL;DR: Machine identities now sit at the centre of several recent breach paths because service accounts, API keys, and tokens often carry broad, always-on access, according to Token Security's analysis of recent attacks. The governance problem is not simply credential volume, but the assumption that machine access behaves like human access and can be managed the same way.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Token Security: “The Machine Identity Attack Surface - MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK Redefined”.
By the numbers:
- Reported data compromises increased from 1,801 in 2022 to 3,205 in 2023, a 78% increase over the year, according to Token Security.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when organisations keep using standing privileges for machine identities?
A: Standing privilege turns NHIs into persistent trust anchors.
Q: Why do machine identities create larger lateral movement risk than teams expect?
A: Machine identities often have wider, longer-lived access than human users and are embedded in application dependencies.
A: Security teams should treat machine identities as first-class identities, not secondary technical artifacts.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every non-human identity Build a complete map of service accounts, API keys, tokens, certificates and managed identities, including where each is used and what it depends on.
- Bind each credential to an owner and business purpose Require a named owner, purpose and expiry condition for every machine identity so orphaned accounts do not survive team or application changes.
- Reduce standing privilege on integrations Strip service accounts and tokens back to the minimum permissions needed for the integration or workload, then validate the reachable systems they can touch.
Bottom line: Machine identities widen the attack surface because they often keep standing access long after the systems that use them have changed.
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06/07/2026 9:53 am
Machine identity attack surface is now a governance problem, not a discovery problem: the article shows that service accounts, API keys and tokens are already part of production access paths, not a side inventory. Once those identities are embedded in application workflows, they behave like standing infrastructure privileges rather than discrete credentials. That means the real issue is governing scope, ownership and revocation across runtime dependencies. Practitioners need to stop treating machine identity as an asset list and start treating it as an access model.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do security teams know if machine identity governance is working?
A: Look for fewer standing accounts, faster onboarding of automation workflows, auditable role approvals, and visible retention of access records after logout. If teams still depend on manual tracking to explain machine access, governance is only partially effective. Working machine identity governance should reduce both operational overhead and review friction.
👉 Read our full editorial: The machine identity attack surface is widening faster than controls