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07/06/2026 9:24 pm
TL;DR: Server-only PAM leaves gaps for databases, Kubernetes, cloud CLIs, and network devices, while SSH and RDP-centric models add setup and audit complexity, according to StrongDM’s comparison of Okta Advanced Server Access alternatives. The core issue is not just access control, but whether identity governance follows the full resource surface.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by StrongDM: Competitors and alternatives to Okta Advanced Server Access
By the numbers:
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when server-only PAM is used for a mixed infrastructure estate?
A: Server-only PAM breaks down when databases, Kubernetes, cloud CLIs, and network devices need the same governance.
Q: Why do bastion hosts create governance and availability risk?
A: Bastion hosts concentrate trust into one intermediary, so they become both a governance choke point and a technical dependency.
Q: How can security teams know whether privileged access logging is complete?
A: Logging is complete only when it covers the full access path, including session records, protocol activity, and the privileged actions performed after login.
Practitioner guidance
- Map privileged access by resource class Inventory SSH, RDP, databases, Kubernetes, cloud CLIs, and network devices separately so you can see where one access tool stops and another control plane begins.
- Test offboarding against every downstream system Verify that a single identity change removes access across servers, databases, and clusters, not just the initial login path.
- Validate audit coverage across protocol boundaries Confirm that logs capture not only session start and end, but also protocol activity, database queries, and administrative commands where they occur.
What's in the full article
StrongDM's full blog post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- A side-by-side comparison of Okta ASA, StrongDM, Teleport, and bastion hosts for different infrastructure patterns.
- The specific feature trade-offs around SSO, session recording, audit log export, and protocol coverage.
- The deployment and maintenance implications of running access software on every server or cluster.
- The pricing and operational constraints that matter when environments are large, ephemeral, or highly distributed.
👉 Read StrongDM's comparison of Okta ASA alternatives for server access →
Okta ASA alternatives: what server-only access misses?
Explore further
08/06/2026 9:20 am
Server-only PAM is a partial control, not a governance model. The article shows that SSH and RDP access can be centralised while databases, Kubernetes, cloud CLIs, and internal web apps remain outside the same control plane. That is a structural gap, because identity governance is only as complete as the resources it can see, log, and revoke. Practitioners should read server access tooling as one layer in a broader access architecture, not the architecture itself.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations replace bastion hosts with a broader access control plane?
A: Many organisations should, if they need consistent access governance across more than servers. A broader control plane becomes more useful when it hides underlying credentials, supports multiple resource types, and maintains evidence across sessions. The decision depends on whether the current architecture can govern the full estate without creating isolated exceptions.
👉 Read our full editorial: Okta ASA alternatives expose the limits of server-only PAM
