TL;DR: Cross-tenant confused deputy risk can emerge from Azure's platform-level managed identities, according to Vectra AI, when customer-assigned RBAC lets platform services reach backend resources. Governance has to account for provisioned access, runtime forwarding, and provider-side enforcement separately.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Vectra AI: “Azure’s Hidden Operators: A Threat Model for Platform-Level Managed Identities”.
Key questions
Q: Why do provider-managed identities create cross-tenant confused deputy risk?
A: Because a powerful intermediary can be tricked into using its own authority on behalf of a caller that should not inherit that authority.
Q: How can security teams tell whether a managed-identity control is only working at provisioning time?
A: If the control depends on a deployment workflow, but the service can later forward runtime requests to arbitrary backend targets, the check is incomplete.
Q: What breaks when a cloud service uses a provider-owned managed identity outside the tenant boundary?
A: The customer loses direct ownership of the actor while still depending on it for access to backend resources.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory provider-owned identity touchpoints Identify services where Azure-managed platform identities can access your Key Vault, storage, APIs, or third-party connectors, and classify them separately from customer-managed managed identities.
- Review runtime proxy and connector flows Test API Connection and similar forwarding paths for path traversal, target-URI manipulation, and scope escape before assuming deployment-time checks cover runtime access.
- Validate RBAC grants at connection creation Require explicit approval for every customer-assigned RBAC grant that enables a provider-managed identity to reach backend resources, and keep an exception record for each one.
Bottom line: Platform-owned managed identities can act on customer resources without ever becoming customer-owned identities, which changes how governance must be assigned.
Glossary terms: Platform-Level Managed Identity, Cross-Tenant Confused Deputy, Link by Reference, Credential Forwarding
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Platform-level managed identities create a trust boundary that customer IAM does not fully own: these identities are provider-managed, tenant-invisible, and still capable of acting on customer resources through customer-assigned RBAC. That is a materially different governance problem from ordinary workload identity, because the customer can grant access without being able to enumerate or lifecycle-manage the actor behind it. The implication is that identity governance must distinguish ownership of the resource from ownership of the identity acting on it.
A question worth separating out:
A: Only with clear service-level approval, a documented business need, and an explicit understanding that customers may have little or no preventative control over cross-tenant behaviour. If the service cannot be used safely without broad delegated authority, the risk decision belongs in governance, not in a hidden permission grant.
👉 Read our full editorial: Platform-level managed identities expose a cross-tenant deputy risk