TL;DR: Rising machine identities, now at 45 for every human identity, will more than double in 18 months, making secrets management central to defending against credential-based attack paths across the MITRE ATT&CK lifecycle, according to Akeyless. The practical issue is not just rotation, but whether NHI governance, RBAC, JIT, and dynamic secrets can shrink standing privilege before attackers exploit exposed credentials.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Akeyless: Secrets management and MITRE ATT&CK in the context of growing machine identities
By the numbers:
- For every human identity, there are 45 machine identities, and that ratio will more than double in the next 18 months.
- 80% of organisations report their AI agents have already performed actions beyond their intended scope, including accessing unauthorised systems, sharing sensitive data, and revealing credentials.
- When AWS credentials are exposed publicly, attackers attempt access within an average of 17 minutes and as quickly as 9 minutes in some cases.
Questions worth separating out
Q: What breaks when machine identities rely on bearer secrets?
A: Bearer secrets can be replayed once exposed, so possession of the token becomes enough to act.
Q: Why do service accounts with standing privilege increase lateral movement risk?
A: Standing privilege expands the blast radius of one compromised identity.
Q: How do security teams know whether secret rotation is actually working?
A: Rotation is working only if exposed credentials are found quickly, revoked everywhere they are used and replaced before attackers can reuse them.
Practitioner guidance
- Classify every secret as an identity asset Map service accounts, API keys, tokens, and certificates into the same governance inventory used for human access.
- Reduce standing privilege on all machine accounts Review workload roles for persistent permissions that outlive the task they support.
- Shorten the exposure window for exposed credentials Automate rotation for secrets with any external or shared exposure path, especially those in CI/CD, code repositories, and cloud configuration.
What's in the full article
Akeyless's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The article’s ATT&CK mapping examples for initial access, privilege escalation, and exfiltration.
- The product-specific explanation of dynamic secrets, RBAC, JIT access, and secretless architecture.
- The white paper download referenced in the post, which goes deeper into the implementation narrative.
- The vendor’s demo path for teams that want to inspect the platform workflow directly.
👉 Read Akeyless's analysis of secrets management and MITRE ATT&CK mapping →
Secrets management and ATT&CK mapping: what IAM teams should fix?
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Secrets management is becoming the control plane for machine identity governance. As LLMs and agentic AI increase the number of service accounts, API keys, and certificates in circulation, secrets handling stops being a plumbing issue and becomes an identity discipline. The practical implication is that organisations must treat every secret as a governed identity with lifecycle, scope, and audit requirements.
A few things that frame the scale:
- The average enterprise already has more than 100 times as many machine identities as human identities in some environments, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Machine identity sprawl is also visible in breach data, where credential exposure repeatedly appears as the entry point rather than the end state.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What frameworks should guide NHI secrets governance?
A: OWASP-NHI, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and Zero Trust Architecture are the most relevant starting points for machine identities and secrets. They help teams connect credential lifecycle, access scope, and continuous verification to actual operating controls rather than treating secrets management as a storage problem.
👉 Read our full editorial: Secrets management and MITRE ATT&CK: closing NHI attack paths