Topic starter
25/06/2026 1:04 am
TL;DR: A compromised low-privilege user can pivot through owned service principal access, add a client secret, and use app-only authentication to reset a Global Administrator account, bypassing user-centric controls like MFA and Conditional Access, according to Semperis. The lesson is that application ownership is itself a privileged control surface, and unmanaged service principals can collapse the boundary between delegated and app-only access.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Semperis: “EntraGoat Scenario 1: Service Principal Ownership Abuse in Entra ID”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when a user can own a privileged service principal?
A: A user who owns a privileged service principal can often change credentials, pivot into app-only authentication, and exercise the application’s assigned role without using the user account directly.
Q: Why do MFA and Conditional Access not stop this attack path?
A: Those controls govern human interactive sessions, not every app-only authentication flow.
Q: What are the signs that service principal ownership is being misused?
A: Watch for non-admin users owning apps with directory roles, new client secrets added to enterprise applications, and a sudden switch from delegated user activity to app-only authentication.
Practitioner guidance
- Review service principal ownership for privilege-bearing apps Identify every enterprise application owned by non-admin users and flag any app with directory roles, authentication management rights, or tenant-wide operational scope.
- Separate app ownership from credential control Restrict who can add secrets or certificates to service principals, and ensure those rights are not implied by routine application ownership.
- Recertify role-bearing applications as privileged assets Put enterprise apps with authentication or directory roles into the same review cycle as privileged accounts, with explicit sign-off on continued ownership and purpose.
Bottom line: Service principal ownership can be a privilege escalation path when the owner can add credentials and control an app with sensitive roles.
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25/06/2026 10:14 am
Application ownership has become a privileged control surface. Ownership over a service principal is not administrative housekeeping when the app can mint its own credentials and inherit tenant roles. The governance model breaks when ownership is assigned without role sensitivity, because the owner can effectively steer the application’s security identity. Practitioners need to treat app ownership as part of privileged access governance, not just application administration.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations treat service principal ownership as privileged access?
A: Yes. If an owner can change credentials or influence a role-bearing application, ownership is a privileged capability and should be governed accordingly. Recertify it, limit who can hold it, and align it with the app’s effective blast radius rather than with application convenience.
👉 Read our full editorial: Service principal ownership misuse can lead to global admin takeover