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08/06/2026 4:57 pm
TL;DR: SSH keys replace passwords with public-private cryptography, but the operational risk sits in key distribution, rotation, revocation, and visibility, according to StrongDM’s guide on RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. The real governance issue is that SSH access remains a non-human identity problem, so unmanaged keys can outlive roles, owners, and intended scope.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by StrongDM: Comparing SSH Keys: A Comprehensive Guide (RSA, DSA, ECDSA)
By the numbers:
- 96% of organisations store secrets outside of secrets managers in vulnerable locations including code, config files, and CI/CD tools.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern SSH keys in cloud and server environments?
A: Treat SSH keys as governed non-human identities.
Q: Why do SSH keys create risk when they are not rotated or revoked?
A: Because the credential persists even after the original business need has changed.
Q: What breaks when SSH keys are managed manually across many systems?
A: Manual management breaks inventory accuracy, ownership clarity, and timely revocation.
Practitioner guidance
- Inventory every SSH key pair Build a complete record of where keys exist, who owns them, which hosts trust them, and whether they are tied to automation or a named operator.
- Rotate SSH credentials on a defined cadence Set a rotation policy for long-lived SSH keys and align it with role change, system change, and offboarding events.
- Remove manual key sprawl from server access Move distribution and revocation into a central control point so authorized_keys files are not managed ad hoc across environments.
What's in the full article
StrongDM's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step SSH key comparison commands for fingerprints, algorithms, lengths, and authorized keys.
- Server-side validation examples that show how to verify the private key still matches the public key.
- Centralized SSH access management workflows for distribution, auditing, and revocation.
- Onboarding and offboarding handling for environments that still rely on manual key administration.
👉 Read StrongDM's guide to SSH key comparison and access management →
SSH key algorithms and access control: are your reviews keeping up?
Explore further
08/06/2026 6:52 pm
SSH keys are an NHI governance problem first and a cryptography problem second. The article correctly explains the mechanics of public-private key authentication, but the real risk sits in unmanaged credential lifecycle. Once an SSH key is embedded in a workflow, copied between systems, or never removed after a role change, it becomes a standing access path. Practitioners should treat SSH keys as governed machine identities, not static configuration artefacts.
A few things that frame the scale:
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations treat SSH access as part of PAM and access review programmes?
A: Yes. SSH is privileged access whenever it reaches production systems, infrastructure, or sensitive data paths. If it is excluded from PAM and access review processes, teams miss a major non-human identity channel that can persist for months. The right frame is governance of privileged machine access, not just secure remote login.
👉 Read our full editorial: SSH key comparison exposes the governance gap in access management
