TL;DR: Hidden credentials, cloned identities and unclear ownership leave machine identity governance exposed, as Delinea notes. Inventory, rotation and offboarding become the controls that determine whether non-human access can be tracked and retired cleanly.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Delinea: “Cybersecurity Awareness Month PSA: Machines are identities too”.
Key questions
Q: Why do shared API keys and tokens create such a large risk for machine identities?
A: Shared machine credentials expand risk because they are reusable, hard to attribute, and often copied into code or multiple environments.
Q: How do security teams know whether machine identity governance is working?
A: They know it is working when every non-human credential has a named owner, a visible system scope, and a documented retirement path.
Q: What breaks when organisations manage machine identities like user accounts?
A: The programme loses visibility, ownership, and lifecycle control.
Practitioner guidance
- Establish authoritative machine identity inventory Continuously discover service accounts, API keys, tokens, certificates, and workload identities across cloud and on-premises environments, then assign an accountable owner and business service to each one.
- Remove shared secrets from production paths Replace static credentials with vaulted, short-lived credentials wherever systems support it, and track every location where the same secret has been duplicated.
- Enforce machine-specific offboarding Tie deprovisioning to application retirement, environment teardown, vendor exit, and pipeline changes so orphaned machine identities do not persist after the original use case ends.
Bottom line: Machine identities create a governance gap when organisations apply human IAM patterns to non-human subjects with different authentication and lifecycle behaviour.
Glossary terms: Machine Identity, Shared Secret, Standing Privilege, Identity Blast Radius
Explore further
View Full Forum → | NHI Foundation Course → | Our Services → | Read the full analysis →
Human IAM assumptions do not survive machine identity reality: the article shows that non-human identities are not just another account type. They are created, authenticated, and retired through different mechanics, so MFA-centred user IAM leaves the core machine-identity risk untouched. The practitioner conclusion is that governance must start from the identity's operating model, not from the nearest human control.
A few things that frame the scale:
- NHIs outnumber human identities by 25x to 50x in modern enterprises, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: When should organisations prioritise workload identity controls over more user-focused IAM work?
A: Organisations should prioritise workload identity controls when service accounts, automation tokens, or API keys can reach sensitive systems without strong verification. If those credentials are widespread, long-lived, or hard to inventory, they are already a material attack path and should be treated as a governance priority.
👉 Read our full editorial: Machine identity governance must extend beyond user IAM assumptions