Older adults report some of the largest and fastest-growing fraud losses to the FBI, and most of those losses pass through a bank, a broker, a payment app or a care setting where someone had a chance to notice. The FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2025 report recorded 201,266 complaints from people aged 60 and over with losses of $7.748 billion, up 59% on 2024, after a 43% rise the year before. This guide is for fraud, financial crime and customer protection teams in banks, building societies, brokers and payment firms, and for managers in care homes and home care providers who handle residents' money. It covers how scams and exploitation reach older customers, vulnerability flags, trusted contacts, transaction holds and delays, staff training, reporting and the regulatory hooks in the US and UK. For the payment fraud mechanics behind most of these cases, see the Authorised Push Payment (APP) Fraud Guide.
Key takeaways
- Two different problems need two sets of controls. Scams by strangers (investment, tech support, romance, impersonation) and exploitation by people in a position of trust (family, carers, attorneys) look different in the data and need different responses.
- Trusted contacts are the cheapest high-value control. A named person the firm may call when it cannot reach the customer or suspects exploitation gives staff somewhere to go before money leaves; it does not give that person account access.
- Holds and delays buy time, but only with rules. FINRA Rule 2165 allows broker-dealers an initial hold of up to 15 business days for specified adults, and some US states allow bank holds; policies must define triggers, notifications and limits.
- Treat vulnerability as a state, not an age. The FCA defines vulnerable customers by circumstances such as poor health, life events, low resilience and low capability; age-only rules risk discrimination and miss younger customers at risk.
- Report consistently. US institutions should tag suspicious activity reports with "EFE FIN-2022-A002" so regulators can see trends, and refer victims to recovery routes quickly.
How older customers are targeted
IC3 data shows where the money goes. Investment fraud dominates losses, while tech support and phishing dominate complaint counts, which means front-line staff see many small attempts and a smaller number of life-changing losses.
| Crime type (age 60 and over, IC3 2025) | Reported losses | Typical pattern your staff will see |
|---|---|---|
| Investment | $3.52 billion | Repeated transfers to an exchange or new payee, often crypto, after contact on social media or messaging apps; customer coached to say the money is for family or home improvements |
| Tech or customer support | $1.04 billion | Remote access software on the customer's device, an urgent call about a "refund" or "compromised account", cash or gold withdrawals, crypto ATM deposits |
| Confidence or romance | $584 million | Gradual increase in transfers to an overseas payee, gift cards, the customer protective of a new online partner |
| Business email compromise | $568 million | Changed payee details on property purchases, solicitor or builder payments |
| Government impersonation | $413 million | Customer told their account is under investigation and must move money to a "safe account" or courier cash |
The same report counts 42,271 complaints from people aged 60 and over involving cryptocurrency, with $4.35 billion lost, and 6,188 crypto ATM or kiosk complaints with $257 million lost, the largest share of any age group. Firms that allow card or bank transfers to exchanges, and operators of crypto kiosks, should treat these flows as a priority. See the Romance and Investment Scam Awareness Guide, the Recognising Tech Support Scams Guide and the Impersonation Scams Guide for customer-facing material.
Exploitation by trusted people: the December 2024 interagency statement from US banking regulators and FinCEN separates "elder theft" by people known to the victim, including caregivers and fiduciaries, from scams by strangers. Signs include a new joint account holder or attorney who starts moving funds, caregivers answering for the customer, isolation from family, and spending that does not match the customer's needs. Care providers see these signs first.
Identifying vulnerability without discriminating
The FCA's guidance on the fair treatment of vulnerable customers (FG21/1) describes vulnerability as a spectrum anyone can move along, driven by four characteristics: health (including cognitive impairment), life events (bereavement, new caring responsibilities), resilience to financial or emotional shocks, and capability (literacy, numeracy, digital skills). The US interagency statement warns that elder protection policies must not result in age discrimination prohibited by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Build controls on observed circumstances and behaviour, with age as one input among several.
- Vulnerability flags: record, with the customer's consent where required, needs such as hearing loss, recent bereavement, cognitive decline or a preference for branch contact. Store flags in a protected field with a clear purpose, a review date and access limited to staff who need it. Under UK GDPR, health information is special category data, so document the condition for processing.
- Behavioural signals: a customer who has never used online banking suddenly making large transfers, multiple failed log-ins followed by a new device, a new payee followed by a large first payment, remote access software detected by the banking app, or a call where someone else is audibly prompting the customer.
- Account changes: new authorised users, powers of attorney, address or phone changes followed by high-value activity, and new cards sent to a different address. These overlap with account takeover; see the Account Takeover Prevention Guide.
Trusted contacts and protective account features
A trusted contact is a person the account holder names whom the firm may contact if it cannot reach the customer or has concerns about exploitation, health status or the identity of someone acting for them. FINRA Rule 4512 requires broker-dealers to make reasonable efforts to obtain the name and contact details of a trusted contact aged 18 or over for non-institutional accounts, and to tell the customer in writing at account opening that the firm may contact that person about possible exploitation, current contact details, health status or the identity of a guardian or attorney. The interagency statement encourages banks to offer the same option. A trusted contact generally cannot view or transact on the account unless separately authorised, so explain this clearly to the customer and record the consent.
| Feature | What it does | Design points |
|---|---|---|
| Trusted contact person | Named person the firm may call in specified circumstances | Collect at onboarding and periodic review; record which circumstances allow contact; never use a trusted contact who is the suspected abuser |
| Payment limits chosen by the customer | Lower daily limits for transfers, card cash withdrawals or new payees | Customer-controlled, with a cooling-off delay before limits are raised |
| Delayed or confirmed first payments | Hold the first large payment to a new payee for a set period or until confirmed through a separate channel | Call-back must use a number on file, not one given during the session |
| View-only access for a carer or family member | Lets a helper monitor without the ability to move money | Separate credentials for the helper; never shared passwords |
| Blocks on high-risk merchants | Optional blocks on gambling, crypto exchanges or gift card merchants | Offer as a choice, explain the effect, review on request |
| Third-party mandates and powers of attorney | Formal authority for someone to act | Verify the document, register it, monitor attorney activity against the donor's interests |
Transaction holds, delays and interventions
Holds give time to talk to the customer, a trusted contact or authorities before money leaves. They must be grounded in law or contract and applied consistently.
- Broker-dealers (US): FINRA Rule 2165 covers specified adults, defined as people aged 65 or over, or aged 18 or over where the firm reasonably believes a mental or physical impairment leaves them unable to protect their own interests. A firm may place a temporary hold on a disbursement of funds or securities for up to 15 business days, extend it by up to 10 business days if its internal review supports the belief of exploitation, and by up to a further 30 business days if it has reported the matter to a state regulator, agency or court. It must notify all authorised parties and the trusted contact within two business days, unless it reasonably believes they are involved. (Rule text checked on finra.org, 27 October 2026.)
- Banks and credit unions (US): the interagency statement notes that some state laws allow temporary holds on suspected exploitation, often with time limits and sometimes immunity. Policies should take account of the customer's explanation, disclosure duties and rules on unfair or deceptive practices. Check your state's statute before relying on a hold.
- UK payment firms: interventions focus on delaying and questioning payments that show scam indicators, warning customers with tailored messages, and using Confirmation of Payee. See the Confirmation of Payee and Payee Verification Guide. UK reimbursement rules for APP scams are covered in the APP fraud guide.
- Effective conversations: staff should ask open questions ("How did you hear about this investment?"), speak to the customer alone, and recognise that scam victims are often coached to lie and to distrust bank staff. Scripted checklists that accept "yes, it's for my nephew" fail.
Care providers and people handling residents' money
Care homes, home care agencies and supported living providers often hold residents' cash, manage personal allowances or support people with online banking. That access creates both the best early warning point and a risk of abuse by staff.
- Separation of duties: two people sign for cash held for residents, receipts are kept for every purchase, and balances are reconciled at a set interval by someone who does not handle the cash.
- No staff access to residents' credentials: staff never know a resident's PIN or online banking password and never use a resident's card. Where help is needed, use formal arrangements such as an appointee or attorney, or a bank's view-only access.
- Device hygiene: shared tablets and phones used to help residents keep in touch should have separate profiles, no saved banking logins and controls against remote access apps being installed. See the Securing Home Computers Guide for household-level settings.
- Watch for scam contact: unexpected parcels, couriers collecting cash, frequent calls from "the bank" or "police", or a resident suddenly anxious about money. Record and escalate under your safeguarding procedure.
- Escalation: in England, section 42 of the Care Act 2014 requires the local authority to make, or cause to be made, enquiries where it has reasonable cause to suspect that an adult with care and support needs is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect, including financial abuse, and cannot protect themselves because of those needs. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own legislation, so check the local rules. Providers should report concerns through their local safeguarding route and inform the person's bank if fraud is suspected.
Staff training, reporting and recovery
The interagency statement recommends recurring training on red flags and escalation for all staff who deal with customers or their agents, including those handling powers of attorney. In the US the Senior Safe Act (12 U.S.C. 3423) protects institutions and trained employees from liability in civil or administrative proceedings when they disclose suspected exploitation to covered agencies in good faith, provided employees received timely training.
- Train by role: branch and contact centre staff on conversations and red flags; operations staff on holds and escalation; investigators on evidence and reporting.
- Escalate within minutes: give front-line staff a direct route to a specialist team that can pause a payment, rather than an email queue.
- File and tag reports: US institutions describe the red flags in the SAR narrative, tick the elder financial exploitation box and include "EFE FIN-2022-A002" in the narrative and the designated field, as the interagency statement sets out.
- Refer externally: report to adult protective services or the police where required or appropriate. For recovery of wires, the IC3 Recovery Asset Team and FinCEN's Rapid Response Program work to freeze funds, so speed matters.
- Support the victim: provide a single named contact, help with resetting credentials and devices, and point to the National Elder Fraud Hotline in the US or the national reporting routes in the UK. See the What to Do If You Have Been Scammed Guide and the Consumer Reporting Routes Map.
Implementation and measurement
- Baseline: measure current losses, complaints and SARs involving customers aged 60 and over, split by scam type and by exploitation by known persons.
- Quick wins (first 90 days): collect trusted contacts at onboarding and review, add scam-specific warnings to first payments to new payees, and set up a specialist escalation line.
- Detection rules: add rules for first large payment to a new payee, transfers to crypto exchanges by customers with no history, remote access software indicators in app telemetry, and attorney or new authorised user activity. Run them in monitor-only mode for a month to tune false positives, then enforce.
- Holds policy: write the legal basis, triggers, authority to place and release, notification steps and maximum duration; test it in tabletop exercises with legal and complaints teams.
- Review: quarterly review of cases where money was lost despite an intervention to improve scripts and rules.
| Metric | What it shows |
|---|---|
| Percentage of customers aged 65 and over with a trusted contact on file | Coverage of the cheapest protective control |
| Value of payments stopped or delayed that were confirmed as scams | Effectiveness of interventions |
| Time from front-line concern to specialist review | Whether escalation works in practice |
| Losses per 1,000 customers aged 60 and over, by scam type | Trend in harm, comparable year on year |
| Complaints upheld about holds or interventions | Whether controls are fair and proportionate |
| Percentage of elder exploitation SARs correctly tagged | Reporting quality |
Framework and regulatory mapping
| Source | Provision | What it means for your programme |
|---|---|---|
| FINRA | Rule 2165 Financial Exploitation of Specified Adults | Temporary holds and notification for broker-dealers |
| FINRA | Rule 4512 Customer Account Information | Reasonable efforts to obtain a trusted contact person |
| US banking regulators and FinCEN | Interagency Statement on Elder Financial Exploitation (2024); FinCEN Advisory FIN-2022-A002 | Example practices: governance, training, holds, trusted contacts, SAR tagging, collaboration |
| US federal law | Senior Safe Act, 12 U.S.C. 3423 | Liability protection for trained staff who report in good faith |
| FCA (UK) | FG21/1 fair treatment of vulnerable customers; Consumer Duty | Understand needs, build staff skills, adapt service, monitor outcomes |
| UK GDPR | Special category data (health) | Lawful basis and safeguards for recording vulnerability flags |
Common failure patterns
- Age-only rules: blanket limits for everyone over a certain age frustrate capable customers, invite discrimination complaints and miss vulnerable younger customers.
- Warnings that are ignored: generic "is this a scam?" pop-ups on every payment train customers to click through. Warnings must be specific to the payment purpose and risk.
- Accepting the cover story: staff release a payment because the customer gave a plausible reason, without speaking to them alone or calling the trusted contact.
- Trusted contact who is the abuser: firms collect a contact but do not check whether that person is benefiting from unusual activity.
- Care staff with resident credentials: PINs written on cards or passwords shared with carers make theft easy and investigation hard.
- Slow escalation: concerns sent to a shared mailbox are reviewed after the money has moved and can no longer be recalled.
Practitioner checklist
- Map elder losses and complaints by scam type and by exploitation by known persons, using IC3 categories as a starting taxonomy.
- Offer and record trusted contacts for all customers, with clear explanations of what the contact can and cannot do.
- Write a holds and delays policy with legal basis, triggers, notifications and maximum duration, and test it.
- Add detection rules for new payee plus large payment, crypto exchange transfers, remote access indicators and attorney activity.
- Record vulnerability flags as circumstances with consent, review dates and restricted access, not as an age-based label.
- Train every customer-facing role on red flags and escalation each year, and keep training records for Senior Safe Act purposes where relevant.
- Tag elder exploitation SARs consistently and refer victims to recovery and reporting routes on the same day.
- For care providers, apply two-person controls on residents' cash and forbid staff knowledge of residents' credentials.
Standards and references
- FBI IC3: 2025 Internet Crime Report
- FBI IC3: 2024 Internet Crime Report
- FinCEN and federal banking regulators: Interagency Statement on Elder Financial Exploitation
- FINRA: Rule 2165 Financial Exploitation of Specified Adults
- FINRA: Rule 4512 Customer Account Information
- FCA: FG21/1 Guidance for firms on the fair treatment of vulnerable customers
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Authorised Push Payment (APP) Fraud Guide · Money Mule Detection Guide · Investment Fraud Prevention for Banks and Platforms Guide · Recognising Tech Support Scams Guide