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ENISA Threat Landscape Guide: What the EU Threat Report Says and How to Use It

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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The ENISA Threat Landscape is the most cited picture of cyber threats to Europe, yet most teams quote one headline figure and never turn the report into decisions. This guide summarises the ENISA Threat Landscape 2026, published on 22 September 2026 and covering calendar year 2025, and compares it with the 2025 edition. It explains how ENISA builds the dataset, where the numbers are strong and where they are claim-based, and how to use the findings in a NIS2 risk assessment, a threat-informed control plan and board reporting. It is written for CISOs, threat intelligence analysts and risk managers in EU organisations and in suppliers to them. Figures were checked against the ENISA publications on 27 October 2026; the report is refreshed every year, so check the latest edition before quoting. For global figures from other sources, see the Cybersecurity Statistics Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Public administration is the most targeted sector in the 2026 edition at 31.8% of 8,257 recorded incidents, and 73% of the events affected essential or important entities under NIS2.
  • Hacktivist DDoS dominates volume, ransomware dominates impact: DDoS was 51.3% of incidents, while ENISA names ransomware as the most impactful incident type in the short term.
  • Phishing and exploited vulnerabilities remain the main ways in: phishing was 77.8% of social engineering cases and vulnerability exploitation 60.4% of unauthorised access cases with an identified vector.
  • The data has known limits: much of it comes from open sources and from criminal claims on leak sites and Telegram, so treat percentages as indicators of activity, not exact measures of risk.
  • The report is most useful as an input to your threat model, risk register and exercise scenarios, mapped to your sector chapter, not as a slide of headline numbers.

What the ENISA Threat Landscape is

ENISA, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, publishes the Threat Landscape (ETL) every year as its view of the state of cyber threats to EU Member States and EU-based organisations. It is a horizontal report covering all sectors, supported by thematic and sectorial reports such as the Sectorial Threat Landscape for Public Administration published on 6 November 2025.

  • Methodology: the 2026 edition uses ENISA's updated Cybersecurity Threat Landscape (CTL) methodology, first published on 1 August 2025 and updated in September 2026. It builds on the 2022 methodology and is written for national and EU authorities and the private sector.
  • Dataset: 8,257 incidents collected mainly from open sources, plus anonymised information from Member States and members of the ENISA Cyber Partnership Programme.
  • Period: the 2026 edition moved to the calendar year (1 January to 31 December 2025). The 2025 edition covered 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 and analysed 4,875 incidents, so the two overlap by six months.
  • Language of judgement: ENISA uses words of estimative probability (for example "highly likely") to separate its own assessments from reported facts, with the scale in an appendix.
  • Licence: the report is published under CC BY 4.0, so you can reuse figures in internal material with attribution to ENISA and a note of any changes.

The 2026 report is organised in chapters on overview and trends, sectoral analysis, cybercrime, state-nexus threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), hacktivist threats, vulnerabilities, and outlook, with an appendix on EU law enforcement operations.

Headline numbers: 2026 edition compared with 2025

The two editions use different periods and the 2026 edition expanded its cybercrime tracking to include data breaches and fraud. ENISA says this changed the figures but not the overall trends or rankings. Compare direction, not decimals.

MeasureETL 2025 (Jul 2024 to Jun 2025)ETL 2026 (calendar 2025)
Incidents analysed4,8758,257
Public administration share38.2%31.8%
DDoS share of incidents76.7%51.3%
Ideology-driven activityAlmost 80%57.3%
Financially motivated activity13.4%29.3%
Cyberespionage7.2%5.9%
Main intrusion vectorPhishing about 60% of initial access; vulnerability exploitation 21.3%Phishing 77.8% of social engineering; vulnerability exploitation 60.4% of unauthorised access with an identified vector
Most deployed or active ransomware in the EUAkira (11.6%), SafePay (10.1%), Qilin (7.5%)Qilin, SafePay, Akira, INC Ransom, Hunters International

The intrusion vector rows are not like for like: the 2026 figure for vulnerability exploitation is a share of the small number of unauthorised access incidents where a vector was identified (only 5.2% had one). Quote it with that caveat. The 2025 column follows version 1.3 of the ETL 2025 report (September 2026), which ENISA revised after first publication, so cite that version.

The sector picture

The 2026 edition analyses public administration, business services, transport, manufacturing and finance and banking in depth, with highlights for health and digital infrastructure.

SectorShare of incidents (ETL 2026)What dominates
Public administration31.8%Ideology-driven DDoS: 81.8% of public administration events; NoName057(16), Dark Storm Team and Mr. Hamza among the most active groups
Business services8.5%Hacktivism (NoName057(16) 35.8% of ideology-driven incidents) and DPRK fake IT worker schemes
Transport8%DDoS claims, with railways rising in the second half of 2025; NoName057(16) 58% of transport DDoS claims
Manufacturing6.9%DDoS claims (NoName057(16) 51.8%) plus ransomware; state-nexus activity 8.4% of sector incidents
Finance and banking5.6%DDoS claims (NoName057(16) 40.7%), fraud and targeting of cryptocurrency firms by DPRK-nexus groups

If your sector is small in the table, that does not mean low risk. Low counts often reflect low public visibility. Health, for example, receives highlight coverage and a pointer to ENISA's health sector cyber hygiene guidance. See the Threat Actors Targeting Healthcare Guide for that sector.

Threat actors named in the report

CategoryGroups named by ENISA (2026 edition unless stated)Typical targets in the EU
Russia-nexusAPT29, APT28, Turla, GoldenJackal, DragonFly, Storm-2372Diplomatic entities, government, energy
China-nexusMustang Panda (maritime, at least seven Member States), PurpleHaze, ShadowPad activityMaritime, government, telecoms
Iran-nexusChafer (air transport), Nimbus ManticoreAviation, defence
DPRK-nexusLazarus, Famous Chollima, BlueNoroff, Contagious Interview; Moonstone Sleet noted using Qilin ransomware. The 2025 edition also named Kimsuky and AndarielDefence, cryptocurrency, freelance developers, IT hiring
HacktivistNoName057(16), Dark Storm Team, Mr. HamzaPublic administration, transport, finance websites
Ransomware operatorsQilin, SafePay, Akira, INC Ransom, Hunters InternationalGermany (26.5% of EU claims), France (14.7%), Italy (13.6%), Spain (12.2%)

Our profiles go deeper on several of these: the APT29 (Midnight Blizzard) Threat Actor Profile, the Qilin Threat Actor Profile, the Akira Threat Actor Profile and the NoName057 DDoS Hacktivist Group Profile Guide.

Cybercrime, ransomware and insiders

  • Ransomware: 47.3% of financially motivated activity. ENISA cautions that many figures come from claims on data leak sites whose authenticity and currency could not always be verified. See the Ransomware Leak Sites and Victim Shaming Guide.
  • Data breaches and fraud: newly tracked in more detail. ENISA notes heavy overlap: data stolen through fraud or ransomware is advertised on forums and reused in further fraud.
  • Insiders: insider threats made up a larger share of unauthorised access than before, linked mainly to DPRK-associated IT workers who obtain jobs at EU companies, notably in defence and government-related entities. See the Insider Threat from Fake IT Workers Guide.
  • Misconfiguration: misconfiguration and accidental exposure account for 20.7% of identified unauthorised access vectors, a reminder that not every breach needs an attacker to break in.

Vulnerabilities, supply chain and AI

  • Supply chain: ENISA describes continued targeting of third-party providers, software, repositories and browser extensions, cites the Shai-Hulud npm campaign, and refers to its March 2026 technical advisory on package managers. See the Shai-Hulud npm Worm Guide.
  • Vulnerabilities: exploitation remains the leading identified intrusion vector, and ENISA notes that model improvements are already accelerating vulnerability discovery.
  • AI: ENISA assesses AI is used mainly to augment existing skills rather than create breakthrough capability. It judges it highly likely that AI will increasingly support malicious operations and that 2026 will likely see more kill-chain phases directly enabled by AI. Reported uses include phishing at scale, synthetic identities, AI-generated malware and an AI-assisted cloud intrusion that reportedly reached admin access in eight minutes. The 2025 edition reported that over 80% of phishing emails identified between September 2024 and February 2025 used AI to some extent.
  • Delays in visibility: ransomware and DDoS appear quickly, often through operator claims, while cyberespionage can take six months to over four years to surface. The espionage share is therefore always an undercount for the latest year.

How to use the report in your programme

  1. Read your sector chapter first: extract the actors, incident types and vectors named for your sector and country. Ignore the EU-wide percentages for planning unless your profile matches them.
  2. Translate findings into scenarios: for each relevant finding write one scenario in the form actor, entry point, target asset, impact. For example: "ransomware affiliate enters via unpatched VPN appliance, exfiltrates HR data, encrypts virtualisation hosts". Map each to ATT&CK techniques such as T1566 Phishing, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain or T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact.
  3. Feed the NIS2 risk assessment: NIS2 requires an all-hazards, risk-based approach. Cite the ETL as an external threat source in the risk register, with the edition and date. See the NIS2 Directive Guide.
  4. Check controls against the scenarios: for each scenario confirm the preventive control, the detection and the owner. Gaps become funded actions, not slide bullets.
  5. Exercise the top two: run a tabletop for the highest-ranked scenario (often ransomware) and the most likely (often DDoS for public bodies).
  6. Refresh yearly and on change: schedule a review when the new edition appears each autumn, and keep the previous mapping so you can show what changed.

Which report to use for what

NeedBest ENISA sourceSupplement with
Board briefing on EU threat trendsETL booklet or executive summaryYour own incident data
Sector risk assessmentETL sector chapter and sectorial threat landscapesNational CSIRT and sector ISAC reporting
Detection engineering prioritiesETL intrusion vectors and named actorsMITRE ATT&CK group pages and government advisories
Supplier riskETL supply chain sectionsSupplier assurance and leak site monitoring

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceHow the ETL supports it
NIST CSF 2.0ID.RA-02, ID.RA-03, ID.RA-05Threat intelligence received, threats recorded, used to inform risk
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5PM-16 Threat Awareness Program, RA-3 Risk Assessment, SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and DirectivesDocumented use of external threat reporting
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A5.7 Threat intelligenceCollection and analysis of threat information
NIS2Risk management measures for essential and important entitiesEvidence of a threat-informed, all-hazards approach

Measuring whether the report is being used

  • Percentage of top risk register entries that cite a current external threat source.
  • Number of ETL-derived scenarios with a tested detection.
  • Days from new edition publication to updated threat model.
  • Exercises run per year based on ETL scenarios, and actions closed from them.

Where identity fits

Read across the chapters and a large share of the findings come back to identity, even where the report does not use that word:

  • Phishing and vishing: the dominant social engineering vectors aim at credentials and session tokens. Phishing-resistant MFA removes most of the value of a harvested password. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
  • Fake workers and synthetic identities: DPRK IT worker schemes and AI-generated synthetic identities attack the hiring and onboarding process, so joiner controls and identity proofing belong in the threat model.
  • Machine credentials: supply chain campaigns spread through publishing tokens, CI secrets and cloud keys. Inventory and short-lived credentials are the controls that break the chain. See the Non-Human Identity (NHI) Guide.
  • Admin consoles for edge services: during hacktivist DDoS, CDN and DNS admin accounts become critical and need the strongest protection.

Decision guidance: small and large organisations

QuestionSmall organisation or SMELarge or essential entity
How deep to readExecutive summary, your sector chapter and the ransomware sectionFull report, sector reports and the methodology, with analyst time budgeted
What to act on firstPhishing-resistant MFA, patching of internet-facing systems, offline backupsScenario-based control testing, detection engineering against named actors, supplier assurance
DDoSUse a hosting or CDN provider with built-in protectionDedicated mitigation contracts, ISP escalation and annual exercises
Threat intelligenceNational CSIRT and sector ISAC alerts plus the ETLETL as one of several sources feeding a CTI function and ATT&CK-based coverage maps

The trade-off is effort against precision. A smaller organisation gains most by acting on the three or four controls that address the dominant vectors. A larger one should resist the comfort of headline numbers and test whether its controls actually stop the named actors in its own environment.

Common failure patterns

  • Quoting the wrong edition: mixing 2025 and 2026 percentages in one slide. The periods and methods differ; always state the edition.
  • Treating claims as facts: ransomware and hacktivist counts rely partly on criminal claims. ENISA itself warns about authenticity; do not present them as confirmed breaches.
  • Reading volume as risk: DDoS dominates counts but rarely causes lasting harm, while a single ransomware incident can stop operations for weeks.
  • Ignoring the espionage lag: a low espionage share for the latest year reflects delayed discovery, not reduced activity.
  • Stopping at the summary: the actionable material is in the sector and actor chapters, not the booklet.
  • No owner for the refresh: the mapping goes stale within a year if nobody owns the annual update.

Lessons from incidents

The supply chain theme in the report is easiest to understand through a concrete case. In the Shai-Hulud npm Worm, First Wave (September 2025), long-lived npm publishing tokens on developer machines and in CI let a self-replicating worm publish trojanised packages and leak repository secrets. ENISA cites the campaign as an example of continued targeting of software repositories. The lesson for European readers is that a report figure such as "supply chain" becomes actionable only when you ask which non-human credentials in your own pipelines would let the same thing happen. See the npm Tokens Security Guide.

Practitioner checklist

  • Download the current ETL edition and its sector reports, and note the edition and reporting period.
  • Extract the actors, vectors and incident types named for your sector and country.
  • Write 5-10 threat scenarios from the findings and map each to ATT&CK techniques.
  • Check each scenario against preventive controls, detections and an owner.
  • Cite the ETL as an external source in the NIS2 risk register with the edition date.
  • Label claim-based figures as such in any board or regulator material.
  • Run at least one tabletop exercise per year based on an ETL scenario.
  • Assign an owner to refresh the mapping when each new edition is published.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cybersecurity Statistics Guide · NIS2 Directive Guide · Ransomware Statistics Guide · NoName057 DDoS Hacktivist Group Profile Guide · Threat Intelligence for Identity and NHI Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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