NoName057(16) is the most prolific pro-Russian DDoS group hitting European public bodies, and most of its targets only find out when their website goes down. This profile covers who the group is, what the public record says about its links to the Russian state, how its volunteer-driven DDoSia platform works at a level useful to defenders, and what to put in place before your organisation appears on its target list. It draws on ENISA's threat landscape reports, the July 2025 Europol-coordinated Operation Eastwood and the US Department of Justice indictment announced in December 2025. It is written for SOC leads, network and web operations teams and risk owners in public administration, transport, finance and other sectors the group repeatedly names. For the wider phenomenon, see the Hacktivism Guide.
Key takeaways
- Volume, not sophistication is the group's signature: ENISA's 2025 threat landscape attributes over 60% of recorded hacktivist claims to NoName057(16), almost all of them DDoS against websites.
- State links are now on the public record: the US Department of Justice describes NoName057(16) as a state-sanctioned project administered in part by employees of the Russian Centre for the Study and Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM).
- Disruption is usually short and public: ENISA reports that only about 2% of hacktivist incidents in its 2025 period caused real service disruption, but the group's Telegram claims are designed to make every outage look like a victory.
- Law enforcement action slowed it but did not end it: Operation Eastwood took central servers offline in July 2025, yet ENISA's 2026 report still lists the group among the most active against public administration in calendar year 2025.
- Preparation beats reaction: upstream DDoS protection, a tested response plan and well-protected CDN, DNS and registrar admin accounts decide whether a campaign becomes an outage.
Who they are (names and aliases)
NoName057(16) emerged publicly in March 2022, shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (well-established public reporting; the date is not stated in the sources fetched for this page). It presents itself as a patriotic hacktivist collective, recruits openly on Telegram and claims attacks there daily. MITRE ATT&CK does not track it as a named group at the time of writing, so there is no ATT&CK group ID to map against.
| Attribute | What the public record says | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Names | NoName057(16), often written NoName057 or NoName05716 | Europol, US DOJ, ENISA |
| Tool | DDoSia, a proprietary DDoS client distributed to volunteers | US DOJ (December 2025), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 |
| State nexus | Described as a covert, state-sanctioned project administered in part by CISM employees; CISM was established by Russian presidential order in October 2018 | US DOJ indictment announcement |
| Infrastructure | DDoSia relied on network infrastructure built by CISM employees, according to the indictment | US DOJ |
| Related groups | Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR, also known as Z-Pentest), charged in parallel; the DOJ says the GRU founded, funded and directed CARR | US DOJ |
| Rewards | US State Department offers of up to $10 million for information on NoName057(16) and up to $2 million for CARR | US DOJ |
Attribution on this page follows the named sources exactly. The DOJ statements are allegations in an indictment, and the defendant has pleaded not guilty.
Targeting and motivation
The group is ideology-driven. Its targets track the news: countries that announce military aid to Ukraine, hold elections, host summits or impose sanctions tend to see waves of claims within days. ENISA's figures show how heavily it shapes the European picture:
| ENISA report | Finding about NoName057(16) and hacktivist DDoS |
|---|---|
| Threat Landscape 2025 (July 2024 to June 2025) | Over 60% of hacktivist claims attributed to the group via its DDoSia platform; public administration was the most targeted sector at 38.2% of incidents, and low-impact DDoS made up 94.8% of public administration incidents |
| Threat Landscape 2025, sector sections | The group's share of hacktivist activity was 66.7% in public administration, 71.1% in finance and 75.6% in manufacturing |
| Threat Landscape 2026 (calendar year 2025) | Named with Dark Storm Team and Mr. Hamza among the most active groups against public administration; 58% of transport DDoS claims, 51.8% of manufacturing DDoS claims and 40.7% of finance and banking DDoS claims |
The US DOJ lists victims including government agencies, financial institutions and critical infrastructure such as public railways and ports. Europol states the victims were Ukraine and supporting countries, including many EU Member States. The practical message is simple: any public-facing organisation in a country that supports Ukraine is in scope, and prominence matters more than security posture when the group chooses targets.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
The group's operations are narrow. The mapping below is an NHI Mgmt Group defensive mapping of the behaviour described in the sources to ATT&CK v20 techniques; it is not an ATT&CK group record.
| Behaviour (as described by sources) | ATT&CK technique | Defender focus |
|---|---|---|
| Volunteers run DDoSia to send floods of requests at target websites | T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood, T1499.003 Application Exhaustion Flood | Layer 7 protection, rate limits, caching, bot management |
| Traffic volume aimed at saturating links or network services | T1498 Network Denial of Service, T1498.001 Direct Network Flood | Upstream scrubbing, ISP coordination, capacity planning |
| Rented servers and central command infrastructure (taken down in Operation Eastwood) | T1583.003 Virtual Private Server | Threat intelligence on infrastructure, blocklists with expiry |
| Distributing the tool to a crowd of volunteer machines that behave like a botnet | T1583.005 Botnet | Reputation feeds, geography and ASN based controls during attacks |
| Telegram channels for recruitment, target lists and claims | T1585.001 Social Media Accounts | Monitoring claims as early warning, communications planning |
CISA, the FBI and MS-ISAC classify DDoS into volume-based, protocol-based (OSI layers 3 and 4) and application-layer (layer 7) attacks, and note that attackers often combine them. Hacktivist floods against websites typically concentrate on the application layer, which is why a website can fall over while the network link looks healthy. Do not try to reproduce the tool: defenders need the traffic profile from their own logs and their provider, not the client.
How they abuse identities and credentials
NoName057(16) is not a credential theft group. Its attacks need no account on your systems, which is exactly why identity teams sometimes ignore it. Three identity angles still matter:
- Your edge admin accounts are the real target surface: during a DDoS, the people who can change CDN rules, WAF policy, DNS records and registrar settings become critical. A compromised CDN or DNS admin account turns a nuisance into an outage or a hijack. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and break-glass procedures on these consoles. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
- API tokens for mitigation automation: many teams script mitigation through provider APIs. Those tokens are non-human identities with power to disable protection. Scope them narrowly, store them in a vault and rotate them. See the Secrets Management Guide.
- Volunteer identities: the DOJ says the group published a daily leaderboard of top attackers and paid top-ranking volunteers in cryptocurrency. That model rewards scale over skill, so expect sudden surges of low-quality traffic from many residential and hosting networks at once.
The related CARR group, charged alongside, did intrude into industrial control systems; the DOJ cites damage at US public drinking water systems. Those intrusions relied on exposed, poorly protected remote access, which is covered in the Pro-Russia Hacktivists Targeting OT Guide.
Notable incidents
| Date | Event | What defenders should take from it |
|---|---|---|
| July 2024 to June 2025 | ENISA attributes over 60% of hacktivist claims in the EU to the group | Expect claims, not breaches; plan communications as well as mitigation |
| 14 to 17 July 2025 | Operation Eastwood, coordinated by Europol: Germany issued six arrest warrants for suspects living in Russia, two described as the main instigators; central server infrastructure taken offline | Takedowns disrupt infrastructure but crowd-sourced groups rebuild quickly |
| Calendar year 2025 | ENISA 2026 report still lists the group among the most active against EU public administration and the leading claimant against transport | Do not stand down defences after a takedown headline |
| 9 December 2025 | US DOJ announces a Ukrainian national arraigned on a NoName057(16) conspiracy charge, alongside a separate CARR indictment, and describes the CISM link | Attribution to the Russian state is now formal in US court filings, which matters for sanctions screening and insurance wording |
Sources differ on the scale of the Eastwood takedown: Europol material describes disrupting an attack infrastructure of over one hundred computer systems worldwide. Quote the figure from the Europol release you rely on.
Detection and defence
CISA's joint guide and the UK NCSC denial of service guidance both centre on the same four ideas: understand your service, put defences upstream, plan your response and test it. Applied to this group:
- Map what is public: list every internet-facing website, portal, API and DNS zone, with owner, hosting, CDN and the business impact of one hour offline. The NCSC calls this "understand your service".
- Put protection upstream: place public sites behind a CDN or DDoS mitigation provider with always-on layer 7 protection, and agree with your ISP how volumetric attacks are escalated. See the DDoS Protection Guide.
- Harden the origin: lock the origin servers so they only accept traffic from the CDN, cache aggressively, and rate limit expensive endpoints such as search, login and form submissions.
- Baseline and alert: CISA recommends establishing a baseline of normal traffic so deviations stand out. Alert on request rate per path, error rates (HTTP 429, 502, 503), origin CPU and the share of traffic challenged or blocked.
- Write the playbook before the claim appears: name who declares the incident, who can change provider rules, who talks to the press and when to contact the national CSIRT. See the DDoS Response Playbook.
- Test and roll back safely: run tabletop exercises and, where your provider allows it, authorised load tests. Keep emergency rules (geo blocks, challenge pages) as pre-approved changes with a documented rollback, and remove them once the wave ends so legitimate users are not locked out.
- Use claims as early warning: threat intelligence teams can watch public reporting of the group's target announcements and raise protection levels for named sectors. Treat a claim as unverified until your own telemetry confirms impact.
Metrics that show it is working
- Coverage: percentage of public web assets behind upstream DDoS protection with origin lockdown.
- Time to mitigate: minutes from first alert to effective mitigation during real or simulated events.
- Availability: user-facing downtime minutes per hacktivist wave, measured externally.
- Admin hygiene: percentage of CDN, DNS and registrar admin accounts on phishing-resistant MFA.
- Exercise cadence: date of the last DDoS tabletop or test, and actions closed from it.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-5 Denial-of-service Protection, SC-7 Boundary Protection, SI-4 System Monitoring, CP-2 Contingency Plan, IR-4 Incident Handling | Core controls for availability and response |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.IR-04 (adequate resource capacity), DE.CM-01 (networks monitored), ID.RA-03 (threats identified), RS.MA-01 (plan executed with third parties) | Capacity, monitoring and coordinated response with providers |
| EU NIS2 | Essential and important entities must manage risks to network and information systems and report significant incidents | See the NIS2 Directive Guide |
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory every public website, portal, API and DNS zone with an owner and an outage impact rating.
- Put all public sites behind upstream DDoS protection and restrict origins to accept provider traffic only.
- Agree an escalation path and contacts with your ISP and DDoS provider, and test them.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on CDN, WAF, DNS and registrar admin accounts and vault provider API tokens.
- Baseline normal traffic and alert on per-path request rates and 5xx error spikes.
- Write a DDoS playbook with pre-approved emergency rules and a rollback step for each.
- Prepare holding statements so a Telegram claim does not drive the public narrative.
- Feed hacktivist target announcements into threat intelligence and raise protection for named sectors.
- Run a DDoS exercise at least yearly and after any major political event affecting your country's stance on Ukraine.
Standards and references
- US Department of Justice: Justice Department Announces Actions to Combat Two Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Criminal Groups
- Europol: Operation Eastwood against the NoName057(16) network
- ENISA: Threat Landscape 2025
- ENISA: Threat Landscape 2026
- CISA, FBI and MS-ISAC: Understanding and Responding to Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
- NCSC: Denial of Service (DoS) guidance
- MITRE ATT&CK: Endpoint Denial of Service
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Hacktivism Guide · DDoS Protection Guide · DDoS Response Playbook · Pro-Russia Hacktivists Targeting OT Guide · ENISA Threat Landscape Guide