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HEXANE (Lyceum) Threat Actor Profile: Telecoms and Energy Targeting, Stolen Credentials and Defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 20 November 2026 14 min read
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HEXANE, also tracked as Lyceum, Siamesekitten and Spirlin, is a cyber espionage group that has targeted oil and gas companies, telecommunications operators, aviation and internet service providers in the Middle East and Africa since at least 2017, and it gets in mostly by stealing and reusing ordinary passwords. MITRE ATT&CK tracks it as group G1001 and notes that its tradecraft looks similar to APT33 and OilRig, but that differences in victims and tools justify tracking it separately.

For identity and security teams, HEXANE is a clear example of an actor that does not need exotic exploits. Password spraying and brute force against internet facing accounts, followed by spearphishing sent from the compromised mailboxes, gave it a foothold inside energy and telecoms organisations. Fake recruiter personas and impersonated company websites extended that reach to IT staff and, through them, to their clients. This profile summarises what the reporting vendors' own primary research and the ATT&CK group entry say, maps the tradecraft to ATT&CK and turns it into detection and hardening steps. For how this group fits among other state linked actors and how naming schemes overlap, see the Threat Actor Groups Guide.

Key takeaways

  • HEXANE (Lyceum, Siamesekitten, Spirlin) is an espionage group focused on oil and gas, telecommunications, aviation and internet service providers, with victims reported in countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco and Tunisia.
  • Its most consistent entry point is credential abuse: Secureworks reported that the group initially accesses an organisation using account credentials obtained via password spraying or brute force, then sends spearphishing from those accounts.
  • It targets people, not just systems. Executives, human resources staff and IT personnel are repeatedly named as targets, and ClearSky reported infrastructure built to impersonate a company and its HR personnel to lure IT experts.
  • Command and control has moved from DNS and HTTP channels (DanBot, later Shark, Milan and DnsSystem) to legitimate cloud services such as OneDrive, which makes simple domain blocking less effective.
  • Attribution needs care. ClearSky describes the group as an Iranian APT group; Secureworks stated in 2019 that there was insufficient technical evidence to support an attribution assessment. Treat the state link as a vendor assessment, not a settled fact.
  • Telecoms targeting matters beyond the victim: Dragos assessed that telecoms access may be a stepping stone towards man in the middle activity against downstream targets.
  • The best defences are identity controls: phishing resistant MFA on every internet facing service, protection of MFA enrolment, detection of spraying and internal phishing, and tight control of cached and stored credentials.

Who they are (names and aliases)

Different vendors observed HEXANE at different times and gave it their own names. The ATT&CK group entry consolidates them as follows.

NameUsed byNotes
HEXANEDragos, MITRE ATT&CK primary nameDragos described it as an activity group targeting industrial control systems related entities and telecoms.
LyceumSecureworks Counter Threat Unit, KasperskySecureworks reported the group may have been active as early as April 2018.
SiamesekittenClearSkyClearSky's 2021 reporting covers attacks on Israeli IT companies.
SpirlinAccenture (as listed by ATT&CK)Cited in ATT&CK from Accenture's November 2021 reporting.

Vendors have compared the group with others. Secureworks said its tradecraft resembles activity from groups it tracks as COBALT GYPSY and COBALT TRINITY, but that none of the malware or infrastructure has direct links to them. Dragos said HEXANE resembles groups it tracks as MAGNALLIUM and CHRYSENE in targeting and some techniques, but considers it a unique entity because of its combined behaviours, tools and victims. ATT&CK makes a similar comparison with APT33 Threat Actor Profile Guide and OilRig. These are overlaps in style, not proof of a shared operator, so do not merge indicators across these groups without evidence.

On state attribution, the sources differ. ClearSky states that Siamesekitten (also named Lyceum/Hexane) is an Iranian APT group active in the Middle East and in Africa. Secureworks, writing in August 2019, said there was insufficient technical evidence to support an attribution assessment. No government advisory consulted for this profile attributes HEXANE to a specific state organisation. For wider context on Iranian activity, see the Iran State Cyber Operations Guide, and keep the distinction between vendor assessment and government attribution in your own reporting.

Targeting and motivation

HEXANE goes after sectors of strategic national importance. Secureworks described its targets as oil and gas and possibly telecommunications, and reported a May 2019 campaign against oil and gas organisations in the Middle East. Dragos observed HEXANE targeting oil and gas companies in the Middle East, with Kuwait as a primary operating region, and also telecommunications providers in the greater Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Dragos linked an acceleration of activity in early to mid 2019 to heightened tensions in the region.

Dragos also assessed, with moderate confidence, that HEXANE does not possess the access or capability to disrupt industrial control system networks. Its value to an operator is intelligence and positioning: telecoms providers and IT suppliers give visibility of, and potential access to, many downstream organisations. Dragos noted that industrial adversaries increasingly target third party organisations along the supply chains of potential targets, and that telecoms targeting may be a stepping stone to man in the middle attacks.

ClearSky's reporting on Siamesekitten shows the same supply chain logic aimed at IT companies. It described the group as active in launching supply chain attacks, with a goal of penetrating the company's computers to gain access to the company's clients. The first detected attack hit an Israeli IT company in early May 2021, and a second wave in July 2021 hit additional Israeli companies.

The motivation in every source is espionage and access, not destruction or extortion. Defenders in energy, telecoms and managed IT services should treat HEXANE as a patient collector of credentials and communications that may be used later against their customers.

How a HEXANE intrusion unfolds

The sources describe a fairly consistent sequence. Not every intrusion follows every step, but the pattern is useful for tabletop exercises and detection planning.

  1. Preparation. The group registers domains for each campaign. Secureworks reported that its command and control domains typically have a security or web technology theme, are registered for individual campaigns and are usually used within a few weeks. ATT&CK also records domains impersonating the targeted organisation and email accounts, including ProtonMail addresses, used for domain registration.
  2. Reconnaissance of people. ATT&CK records that HEXANE identifies executives, HR and IT staff at victim organisations for targeting, and that it has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR employees to approach potential victims with fake job offers.
  3. Credential access. Password spraying and brute force against internet facing services produce a first set of valid accounts.
  4. Internal spearphishing. Using those compromised accounts, the group sends spearphishing emails. Secureworks described malicious Excel attachments carrying a VBA macro (DanDrop) that drops the DanBot remote access trojan.
  5. Discovery and collection. Post intrusion tools include a PowerShell keylogger (kl.ps1), and tools adapted from open source frameworks to decrypt Remote Desktop Connection Manager files and read LAPS passwords. ATT&CK also records use of built in commands such as whoami, net localgroup, net view, cmdkey and netstat.
  6. Lateral movement and persistence. Remote desktop sessions for lateral movement, scheduled tasks and WMI event subscriptions for persistence.
  7. Command and control and exfiltration. DNS and HTTP channels in earlier tools, custom DNS servers sending commands via TXT records in DnsSystem, and later cloud services such as OneDrive for both control and exfiltration.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

The table below lists a selection of techniques that ATT&CK v20 records for HEXANE (G1001), grouped by tactic. Source attributions in the right column are the reporting cited by ATT&CK for each entry.

TacticTechniqueWhat HEXANE did
Resource developmentT1583.001 Domains; T1583.002 DNS ServerRegistered themed or impersonating domains; set up custom DNS servers that send commands via TXT records.
Resource developmentT1585.001 Social Media Accounts; T1585.002 Email AccountsFraudulent LinkedIn HR personas; email accounts for domain registration.
Resource developmentT1586.002 Email Accounts (compromise)Used compromised accounts to send spearphishing.
Resource developmentT1588.002 Tool; T1608.001 Upload MalwareAcquired and customised open source tools such as Mimikatz and Empire; staged malware on sites impersonating targets.
ReconnaissanceT1589.002 Email Addresses; T1591.004 Identify RolesTargeted executives, HR and IT staff.
Credential accessT1110 Brute Force; T1110.003 Password SprayingObtained valid credentials for initial access.
Credential accessT1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersRan cmdkey; used a Mimikatz based tool and PowerShell to steal Chrome passwords.
CollectionT1056.001 KeyloggingPowerShell keylogger named kl.ps1.
ExecutionT1204.002 Malicious File; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.005 Visual BasicMalicious attachments; PowerShell tooling; VBS launcher for the keylogger.
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1546.003 WMI Event SubscriptionScheduled task for the keylogger; WMI subscriptions.
Lateral movementT1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1534 Internal SpearphishingRDP sessions; internal phishing of executives, HR and IT.
Command and controlT1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool TransferOneDrive used for C2; additional payloads downloaded.
ExfiltrationT1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageOneDrive used for data exfiltration.
Defence evasionT1027.010 Command ObfuscationBase64 encoded scripts.

ATT&CK links HEXANE to software including DanBot, Milan, Shark, Kevin and DnsSystem, as well as public tools such as Mimikatz, Empire, PoshC2 and BITSAdmin. Use the ATT&CK entry for the full, current mapping, because entries are revised between releases.

How they abuse identities and credentials

Almost every stage of a HEXANE intrusion relies on an identity weakness rather than a software flaw.

Passwords on internet facing services

Password spraying works when users can choose guessable passwords and when internet facing services accept a password alone. Secureworks specifically recommended multi factor authentication on internet facing remote access services, and warned that auto enrolment emails can let attackers who hold a compromised password enrol their own device. That warning is still relevant: MFA that a stolen password can register is not a control. See the Password Spraying and Credential Stuffing Defence Guide for detection patterns.

Trusted mailboxes as a delivery channel

Once a mailbox is compromised, HEXANE uses it to phish colleagues. Internal mail from a real colleague bypasses much of the scepticism users apply to external mail, and some filtering treats internal traffic more leniently. The targeting of HR and IT staff is deliberate: HR staff open attachments from strangers as part of their job, and IT staff hold administrative access.

Administrative secrets on endpoints

Secureworks listed post intrusion tools that decrypt Remote Desktop Connection Manager files and read LAPS passwords, and ATT&CK records use of cmdkey to identify stored credentials and theft of browser saved passwords. Each of these turns one compromised workstation, often an IT administrator's, into a store of credentials for servers and other machines. Saved RDP connections, local admin passwords readable by too many accounts and passwords stored in browsers are all non human style secrets sitting on human endpoints.

Persona abuse and recruitment lures

Fake HR personas on professional networks and impersonated company sites give the group a pretext to contact IT specialists directly. Defenders cannot control third party platforms, but they can train staff, particularly IT and security staff, to treat unsolicited job offers that require downloading files as a security event, and to report them.

Cloud services as cover

Using OneDrive for control and exfiltration means traffic goes to a legitimate, widely allowed service, under an attacker controlled account. Controls that restrict which tenants users and devices can reach, and alerting on uploads to personal cloud storage from servers, address this better than domain blocklists.

Notable activity

  • 2018 to 2019, oil and gas in the Middle East. Secureworks reported domain registrations suggesting a mid 2018 campaign against South African targets, a spike in toolkit testing against a public malware scanning service in February 2019, and a May 2019 campaign against oil and gas organisations in the Middle East delivering DanBot.
  • 2019, telecoms and energy. Dragos reported HEXANE targeting oil and gas companies with Kuwait as a primary operating region, and telecoms providers across the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.
  • 2021, Israeli IT companies. ClearSky reported a first attack on an Israeli IT company in early May 2021 and a second wave in July 2021, in which the group upgraded its backdoor from Milan to a new version called Shark.
  • 2021 to 2022, new tooling. ATT&CK records the Kevin backdoor and DnsSystem, the latter using custom DNS servers and TXT records, and cites Microsoft reporting for OneDrive based control and exfiltration.

These descriptions come from vendor research. Victims are not named in the public reporting, and this profile does not speculate about them.

Detection and defence

Detect the entry point

  • Alert on many failed authentications across many accounts from a small set of sources, followed by a success, on VPN, webmail and cloud identity sign in logs. That is the signature of spraying.
  • Alert on new MFA method registration shortly after a sign in from an unfamiliar location or device, and require an already verified factor or helpdesk verification to enrol a new one.
  • Watch for a mailbox that suddenly sends attachments to many internal recipients, especially to HR, IT and executive distribution lists.

Detect post intrusion behaviour

  • Office applications spawning script hosts or PowerShell, and VBS files launching PowerShell from user writable folders.
  • New WMI event subscriptions and scheduled tasks on workstations, which are uncommon outside management tooling.
  • Reads of LAPS password attributes by accounts that do not normally read them, and access to Remote Desktop Connection Manager files.
  • High volumes of DNS TXT queries or unusual DNS record patterns to recently registered domains with security or technology themed names.
  • Servers or admin workstations uploading to OneDrive or other cloud storage under accounts outside your tenant.

Harden

  • Phishing resistant MFA on every internet facing service, starting with remote access and email, as described in CISA's guidance on phishing resistant MFA.
  • Smart lockout and banned password lists to make spraying unproductive.
  • Restrict who can read LAPS passwords, remove saved RDP credentials and disable browser password saving on administrative workstations.
  • Separate administrative accounts from mail enabled day to day accounts, so a phished mailbox does not carry admin rights.
  • For telecoms and managed IT providers, segment customer facing management systems from corporate email and endpoints, and protect the service accounts and API keys that reach customer environments.

For broader hunting approaches, see the Identity Threat Hunting Guide.

Common failure patterns

  • MFA with gaps. MFA on email but not on VPN or legacy protocols, or MFA enrolment that a password alone can complete, leaves spraying viable.
  • Trusting internal mail. Treating mail from a colleague's account as safe, and filtering it less strictly than external mail.
  • Admin secrets on daily use machines. IT staff who read email, browse and hold saved RDP connections and admin passwords on the same device.
  • Over wide LAPS read rights. Helpdesk or broad groups able to read local admin passwords for every machine.
  • Domain only blocking. Relying on indicator blocklists when the actor rotates domains every few weeks and moves to legitimate cloud services.
  • Merging actors by resemblance. Treating HEXANE, APT33 and OilRig as one group and sharing indicators between them, which produces false confidence and noisy detections.
  • Ignoring recruitment lures. Not giving staff a simple route to report suspicious job approaches on professional networks.

Practitioner checklist

  • Enforce phishing resistant MFA on VPN, webmail, remote desktop gateways and cloud identity, and block legacy authentication.
  • Require a verified factor or identity check for MFA enrolment and alert on new methods after risky sign ins.
  • Build and test a password spraying detection on every authentication log source, and rehearse the response.
  • Alert on internal mass mailing with attachments from a single account to HR, IT and executives.
  • Remove saved RDP credentials and browser stored passwords from admin workstations, and audit LAPS read rights.
  • Hunt for new WMI event subscriptions, unusual scheduled tasks and Office spawning script hosts.
  • Monitor DNS for TXT heavy traffic and for newly registered domains with security or technology themes.
  • Restrict uploads to cloud storage tenants outside your organisation from servers and admin hosts.
  • Brief HR and IT staff on fake recruiter approaches and give them a one click reporting route.
  • Label HEXANE attribution in internal reporting as a vendor assessment, and track it separately from APT33 and OilRig.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · Iran State Cyber Operations Guide · APT39 (Chafer) Threat Actor Profile · Password Spraying and Credential Stuffing Defence Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 20 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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