A firmware update mechanism is, in the words of RFC 9019, "essentially authorized remote code execution", so a weak one hands control of every device in a fleet to whoever can sign or replay an image. Connected products now need updates for their whole support period, and ETSI EN 303 645 and the EU Cyber Resilience Act both expect those updates to be secure. This guide explains how to design over-the-air (OTA) firmware updates for constrained IoT devices: the IETF SUIT architecture and manifest, signing and verification, rollback protection, fail-safe installation, and how to protect the signing keys that make it all work. It is for embedded and product security engineers, IoT platform teams and security leads at device manufacturers. Boot chain and secure boot fundamentals are covered in the Firmware and Boot Security Guide; this page focuses on the update path.
Key takeaways
- Security comes from the manifest and image, not the transport. RFC 9019 designs updates to be safe over broadcast and CDNs, so the device must verify a signature over the manifest and the image itself.
- Rollback protection needs a monotonic counter. RFC 9124 requires a manifest sequence number that only increases, and devices must reject lower values; a firmware version string alone is not enough.
- Bind images to device types. Authenticated vendor and class identifiers stop a validly signed image from being installed on the wrong hardware.
- Never brick the fleet. Use A/B slots or a recovery image, boot new images in test mode and revert automatically if the application does not confirm health.
- The signing key is the fleet's master key. Keep it in an HSM, separate signing from building, consider multi-party signing and plan for key rotation before you ship.
The SUIT architecture and where each piece sits
The IETF Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) working group published RFC 9019, "A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things" (Informational, April 2021), and RFC 9124, "A Manifest Information Model for Firmware Updates in Internet of Things (IoT) Devices" (Informational, January 2022). The CBOR-based manifest format itself is draft-ietf-suit-manifest; when checked on 27 October 2026 the datatracker showed version -37 (dated 18 June 2026), intended status Proposed Standard, in the RFC Editor queue. Details may still change before publication as an RFC.
| RFC 9019 role | Responsibility | Security concern |
|---|---|---|
| Author | Creates the firmware image | Build integrity and the author's signing key |
| Device operator | Operates the fleet and usually authorises deployment | Who may approve which update for which devices |
| Trust Provisioning Authority | Distributes trust anchors and authorisation policies, usually the OEM or ODM | Out-of-band trust anchor installation and delegation |
| Status tracker | Announces new firmware, reports device state, may trigger updates | Accurate inventory and update status |
| Firmware server | Stores and distributes images and manifests | Availability; it does not need to be trusted for integrity |
| Firmware consumer | Runs on the device; parses and verifies manifests and stores images | Small, robust parser in the trusted computing base |
RFC 9019 sets out the update steps: notification, pre-authorisation (the device checks the signer is authorised before fetching), dependency resolution, download, installation (which must survive power loss or network interruption) and invocation, where the bootloader verifies the image again before booting it.
Threats the manifest must defeat
RFC 9124 names the threats a manifest addresses and the requirements that counter them. The most important for product teams are below.
| RFC 9124 threat | What goes wrong | Requirement and manifest element |
|---|---|---|
| THREAT.IMG.EXPIRED and THREAT.IMG.EXPIRED.OFFLINE | An old, validly signed image with a known vulnerability is installed | REQ.SEC.SEQUENCE: monotonic sequence number (REQUIRED) |
| THREAT.IMG.INCOMPATIBLE | Firmware for one device type is applied to another | REQ.SEC.COMPATIBLE: authenticated vendor ID and class ID (RECOMMENDED) |
| THREAT.IMG.NON_AUTH | An unauthenticated image is installed | REQ.SEC.AUTHENTIC: signature or MAC over manifest and payload digest |
| THREAT.UPD.WRONG_PRECURSOR | A differential update is applied to the wrong base image | REQ.SEC.AUTH.PRECURSOR: authenticated precursor image digest |
| THREAT.IMG.LOCATION and THREAT.IMG.FORMAT | Payload written to the wrong location or misinterpreted | REQ.SEC.AUTH.IMG_LOC and REQ.SEC.AUTH.IMG_TYPE |
| THREAT.NET.REDIRECT and THREAT.NET.ONPATH | Device fetches from or through an attacker | Signed payload digest and URI in the manifest |
| THREAT.IMG.REPLACE and THREAT.MFST.TOCTOU | Image or manifest swapped between check and use | Verify from protected storage at install and boot |
| THREAT.KEY.EXPOSURE | Signing key exposed | Key protection, rotation and access control (REQ.SEC.ACCESS_CONTROL, REQ.SEC.RIGHTS) |
| THREAT.IMG.DISCLOSURE | Firmware reverse engineered | REQ.SEC.IMG.CONFIDENTIALITY: optional payload encryption |
RFC 9124 is explicit that the sequence number "is not a firmware version field. It is a manifest sequence number." It also notes that a vendor ID "is not proof of identity": trust must be anchored in a cryptographic key.
Designing signing, verification and rollback protection
Signing
- Asymmetric signatures by default: RFC 9019 prefers public key signatures and allows symmetric MACs only for the most constrained devices. A shared symmetric key across a fleet means one extracted key compromises every device.
- Sign the manifest, which carries the image digest: the device verifies the manifest signature, then checks the downloaded image against the digest in the manifest.
- Multi-party authorisation: RFC 9019 allows a device to require signatures from both the author and the device operator, so a single stolen key is not enough.
- Algorithm agility: the manifest must support more than one algorithm. RFC 9019 recommends that immutable ROM bootloader code use post-quantum hash-based signatures such as HSS/LMS (RFC 8778), because ROM code cannot be changed later.
Verification on the device
- Verify twice: before installation and again in the bootloader before execution, as RFC 9019 describes.
- Protect the trust anchor store: RFC 9019 says it "must resist modification against unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification". Use one-time programmable fuses, a key hash in ROM or a secure element.
- Keep the parser small: manifest parsing is attack surface in the trusted computing base. Fuzz it.
Rollback protection
Store the highest accepted sequence number or security counter in storage the attacker cannot reset, and refuse anything lower. Open source bootloaders show the options. MCUboot, for example, documents software downgrade prevention (MCUBOOT_DOWNGRADE_PREVENTION, which compares version numbers and works only with overwrite-only upgrades) and hardware rollback protection (MCUBOOT_HW_ROLLBACK_PROT), which compares a security counter in the image's protected TLV area with a counter held in trusted non-volatile storage. The counter is independent of the version number and only needs to increase when you want to block older images, for example after fixing a serious vulnerability.
Fail-safe installation
An update that bricks devices is an availability incident, and an update mechanism that is unreliable will be switched off. Design for failure.
| Strategy | How it works | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| A/B slots with swap and revert | New image written to a second slot, booted in test mode, made permanent only after the application confirms health | Needs roughly twice the flash for the image |
| Overwrite only | New image overwrites the running image after verification | Simpler, less flash, but no automatic revert to the previous image |
| Execute in place from either slot | Bootloader runs the newest valid image from either slot | MCUboot notes that encryption of images in flash is not supported in its direct-xip mode |
| Recovery image | Minimal fixed image that can fetch a full image | Extra flash and its own maintenance |
MCUboot documents test swaps that revert on the next reset unless the application marks the image as confirmed, and permanent swaps that do not revert. Use test mode for every OTA update and confirm only after the device has reconnected to its service and passed self-tests. RFC 9019 also advises that the bootloader itself is generally not updated, because a failed bootloader update is a serious reliability risk.
Where identity fits: signing keys are non-human identities
The firmware signing key is the most powerful credential a device maker holds: anyone with it can produce code the whole fleet accepts. The MSI Signing Keys Leak 2023 shows the consequence. After a ransomware breach, private firmware image signing keys for 57 MSI products and Intel Boot Guard keys for 116 products were leaked, and keys embedded in devices already in use are hard to revoke.
- Keep keys in an HSM or managed KMS: the build system requests signatures; it never holds the private key. See the Code Signing Security Guide.
- Separate build and sign: a signing service that checks the request came from a protected release pipeline, with approval for production keys.
- Use different keys for development and production: development devices must not trust production keys and production devices must not trust development keys.
- Plan rotation before shipping: RFC 9019 does not define key rotation, so design it yourself: provision more than one trust anchor or a key hierarchy so a compromised signing key can be retired by an update signed with a surviving key. See the Compromised Code Signing Certificate Playbook.
- Device identity for the update channel: each device should authenticate to the status tracker with its own credential, not a shared fleet secret. See the Identity for IoT Fleets Guide and the IoT Device Identity with TPM and DICE Guide.
Regulatory expectations
- ETSI EN 303 645 (V3.1.3), provision 5.3 "Keep software updated": 5.3-2 requires a secure update mechanism unless a resource constraint prevents it; 5.3-7 requires best-practice cryptography for secure updates; 5.3-8 requires timely security updates; 5.3-10 requires that network-delivered updates have their authenticity and integrity verified through a trust relationship; 5.3-13 requires the manufacturer to publish the defined support period. Several further provisions (automatic updates, user control, notifications) are "should". See the ETSI EN 303 645 Consumer IoT Guide.
- EU Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847): entered into force on 10 December 2024, with the main obligations applying from 11 December 2027 according to the European Commission. Its recitals explain that products should be designed so security updates can be distributed and installed automatically while users can deactivate automatic updates (Recital 56), that security updates should be separable from functionality updates where technically feasible (Recital 57) and that security updates should be provided free of charge (Recital 64). Check the binding Annex I text for the exact obligations. See the EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide.
- NIST: the IoT baseline in NIST IR 8259A includes a software update capability. See the NIST IR 8259 IoT Device Cybersecurity Baseline Guide.
Implementation roadmap
- Decide the trust model: who signs, who authorises deployment, how many trust anchors each device holds and how they will be rotated.
- Choose the bootloader and slot layout: select a bootloader that verifies signatures and supports a hardware security counter, and size flash for A/B or a recovery image.
- Stand up the signing service: HSM-backed keys, a pipeline that signs only tagged releases, approval for production signing and an audit log of every signature.
- Test failure cases on hardware: power loss during download and install, a corrupted image, a wrong-device image, a lower sequence number and an image signed with a development key. All must fail safely.
- Roll out in rings: internal devices, then a small percentage of the fleet, then wider, with automatic halt if confirm rates drop or error reports rise.
- Keep a rollback plan: a fixed forward release is usually safer than a downgrade. Raise the security counter only when you are sure you no longer need older images.
- Operate: publish the support period, monitor update coverage and handle vulnerability reports through a defined process. See the EU Cyber Resilience Act Vulnerability and Incident Reporting Guide.
Decision guidance: very small devices with no room for two slots may need overwrite-only updates plus a recovery path; accept that and make verification and power-loss tolerance robust. Products with long field lives or safety impact should use A/B slots, hardware rollback counters and multi-party signing. Teams starting fresh should follow the SUIT information model even if they use a vendor manifest format, so that requirements such as sequence numbers and class IDs are not missed.
Detection and measurement
- Signing service logs: every signature with requester, pipeline run and approver. Alert on signatures outside the release process.
- Device update reports: success, failure reason, sequence number and confirmed version from each device. The SUIT working group's draft-ietf-suit-report addresses secure reporting of update status.
- Verification failures: spikes in signature or digest failures can indicate tampering on the distribution path.
Metrics:
- Percentage of the fleet on a supported firmware version.
- Median time from security release to 90% fleet installation.
- Update failure and automatic revert rates per release.
- Number of production signatures issued outside the release pipeline (target zero).
- Percentage of device models with hardware rollback protection enabled.
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | Other |
|---|---|---|---|
| Signed firmware and verification | SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity; SI-7(15) Code Authentication; CM-14 Signed Components | PR.PS-02 | ETSI EN 303 645 5.3-7, 5.3-10 |
| Timely flaw remediation | SI-2 Flaw Remediation | PR.PS-02 | ETSI EN 303 645 5.3-8 |
| Signing key protection | SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management | PR.DS-01 | RFC 9124 THREAT.KEY.EXPOSURE |
| Provenance of components | SR-4 Provenance, SR-11 Component Authenticity | GV.SC-05 | See the SBOM Guide |
| Fail-safe behaviour | SC-24 Fail in Known State | ID.AM-08 | RFC 9019 installation requirements |
Common failure patterns
- Checking only TLS: trusting the download because it came over HTTPS, with no signature check on the image, fails as soon as the server or CDN is compromised.
- Version strings as rollback protection: comparing an unsigned version string, or one held in resettable storage, lets an old vulnerable image back in.
- One key, no plan: a single production key in a build server, with no second trust anchor, leaves no recovery after compromise, the situation the MSI leak illustrates.
- Development keys in production: production devices that still trust a widely shared development key.
- No test mode: making every update permanent at first boot, so a faulty release bricks devices.
- Updates turned off in the field: mechanisms that are slow or disruptive get disabled by users or operators, leaving fleets on old firmware.
Practitioner checklist
- Every image is described by a signed manifest with digest, vendor ID, class ID and monotonic sequence number.
- Devices verify the manifest and image before install and again at boot.
- Rollback protection uses a counter in storage that cannot be reset.
- New images boot in test mode and revert automatically if not confirmed.
- Production signing keys live in an HSM and are used only by the release pipeline with approval.
- Devices hold more than one trust anchor or a key hierarchy, and rotation has been tested.
- Development and production trust anchors are separate.
- Failure cases (power loss, wrong device, old image, bad signature) are tested on real hardware every release.
- The support period is published and update coverage is reported.
Standards and references
- IETF: RFC 9019, A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things
- IETF: RFC 9124, A Manifest Information Model for Firmware Updates in IoT Devices
- IETF: draft-ietf-suit-manifest, CBOR-based SUIT Manifest
- ETSI: EN 303 645 V3.1.3, Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Cyber Resilience Act
- European Commission: Cyber Resilience Act
- MCUboot: Bootloader Design
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Firmware and Boot Security Guide · Code Signing Security Guide · Identity for IoT Fleets Guide · Uptane and Vehicle OTA Security Guide